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TIMING LEGAL PARENTHOOD
Noy Naaman*
INTRODUCTION
When does a parent become a parent? While the literature
on Assisted Reproductive Technology (“ART”) has explored the
question, who is a parent? scholars in the field have paid less
attention to the question “when should the parental status be
formalized?”1 Is it at birth? Is it when a judicial order confers
that legal status on an individual? Or, has the legal status of
parenthood begun to develop during the time the individual has
spent initiating the parental process and consolidated at the
child’s birth? Yet, these questions have critical legal and practical
implications. The following scenarios illustrate how lacunae in
the legal frameworks that govern the formalization of the parental
relationship leave individuals, whose self-identity as parents (or
parents-to-be) is established, but whose parental status is legally
inchoate, vulnerable to conflicts arising in the law’s blind-spots.
Judith and Barbara, a same-sex couple, conceived through
an anonymous sperm donation. While Judith, the birth mother,
was legally recognized as such in the delivery room, Barbara had
to apply for a post-birth judicial order. Only after a court hearing
and an inspection process conducted by welfare officers, which
was expected to take a few months, would the law—assuming a
*
SJD Candidate at University of Toronto Faculty of Law. I wish to thank Brenda
Cossman for her supervision and endless support in conducting this research. This article
benefited greatly from comments made by Ayelet Blecher-Prigat, Kerry Rittich, Courtney
G. Joslin, Sean H Williams, Daniel Gobbo, Luke Taylor, Joshua Sealy-Harrington, Ido Katri,
Mercedes Cavallo, Emily Schaffer, Megan Ross, Lotem Naaman, Eliran Oziel, Anat Tsur,
Yaron Covo, and by participants in the Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Association,
the Annual Family Law Scholars and Teachers Conference, and the Annual Conference of
McGill Graduate Law Students Association, at various stages of this project. Finally, I thank
the editors of the Arkansas Law Review.
1. Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART), CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION (Oct. 8, 2019), [https://perma.cc/PY7P-6HDC] (last visited Nov. 15, 2021); see
infra notes 37-38.
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favorable outcome—recognize Barbara as the child’s mother.
Shortly after the birth, however, Judith and Barbara separated.
What parental rights, if any, can Barbara claim?
Ben, a single man and a senior associate at a law firm,
decided to become a parent through transnational surrogacy.
When Ben told his employer about his decision and the pre-birth
arrangements involved in the process, including that he might
need to take some time away from work, Ben’s employer told him
that his promotion to a junior partner might be deferred. What
legal recourse, if any, does Ben have against his employer?
Jessica and David, a different-sex couple, conceived with the
assistance of Kelly, a surrogate. During week thirty-two of her
pregnancy, Kelly suffered a stillbirth as a result of medical
malpractice. While the hospital compensated Kelly for her loss,
it denied recovery to Jessica and David for their emotional
distress, simply because neither of them carried the fetus. What
damages, if any, can Jessica and David seek?
A common theme that emerges from these hypothetical
scenarios is uncertainty about what it means to become a parent.
Although each of the individuals has embarked upon the journey
toward parenthood, they have very different statuses in the eyes
of the law.2 In this Article, I examine the question of how the
process of becoming a parent is counted by the law.
To pursue this inquiry, I theorize and problematize the
tension between the construction of the self and legal
identification.3 This tension, termed here “temporal discrepancy,”
refers to the gap between how a person identifies himself and how
the law accounts for that identification in the context of becoming
a parent.4 I argue that this gap places certain individuals in a
vulnerable position within the family and beyond. I focus on two
forms of temporal discrepancy: the first concerns a scenario
occurring after a child is born, when an individual self-identifies
as a parent, but the law has yet to formalize the parental status,
such as in the first hypothetical above.5 The second, illustrated
2.
3.
4.
5.
may be

Infra Section II.A.
See infra text accompanying notes 52-64.
See infra text accompanying notes 47-48.
See infra text accompanying notes 76-86. There are circumstances in which a person
considered a parent as a matter of law before a court has declared him as such. In
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by the second and third hypotheticals above, involves a scenario
occurring before a child’s birth, when an individual self-identifies
as a parent-to-be—a status of becoming that may be rich in
meaning and laden with practical and emotional implications but
that is legally overlooked.6 After analyzing this gap, I consider
how the law could be restructured to alleviate the effects of
temporal discrepancy on parents and parents-to-be.7
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I develops this
Article’s theoretical framework by looking to queer literature on
time, which elucidates how time orients our embodiments in
accordance with (hetero)normative logic and considers what
alternatives to this operation (and understanding) of time might
look or feel like.8 Inspired by this literature, I develop the concept
of temporal discrepancy and mobilize it for analyzing the research
question of this Article.9
Part II focuses on the first form of temporal discrepancy,
represented by the first gap occurring after birth.10 I review the
contingency of this tension in the context of parental
identification,11 mostly involving same-sex couples, in which the
parental status is formalized at a remote moment in time after
birth, but especially in relation to the biological parent’s partner
in cases of ART.12 Then, I set out a taxonomy for understanding
the crippling effects of that tension.13 Finally, I evaluate
regulatory avenues for ensuring that parental status vests as close
this scenario, the judicial order issued after the child’s birth will become effective
retroactively from the child’s birth. Such a person, nonetheless, may be placed in a
vulnerable position. See infra note 134.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 214-27.
7. See discussion infra Sections II.C, III.B.
8. See infra Part I.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 41-48.
10. See infra Part II.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 71-85. The term “contingency” is used to
express how certain tension becomes to be what it is. For the use of this term, see VALERIE
ROHY, CHANCES ARE: CONTINGENCY, QUEER THEORY, AND AMERICAN LITERATURE 2-8
(2019).
12. See generally Jessica Feinberg, Whither the Functional Parent? Revisiting
Equitable Parenthood Doctrines in Light of Same-Sex Parents’ Increased Access to
Obtaining Formal Legal Parent Status, 83 BROOK. L. REV. 55, 76-82 (2017) (discussing
marital presumption, consent to a spouse’s use of ART, and adoption as options for
formalizing after-birth legal parentage for nonbiological parents).
13. See infra Section II.B.
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as possible to the child’s birth and conclude with a set of
considerations for lawmakers.14 While this Article is not the first
to advocate for at-birth parental determination, it offers a novel
theoretical underpinning for the position grounded in the
individual’s evolving self-identification—and thus new support
for the findings of other scholars. Indeed, the justifications
underlying the recognition or denial of rights are significant, as
“different frameworks of analysis cannot reach the ‘same
result.’”15
Part III focuses on the second form of temporal discrepancy,
represented by the second gap occurring before birth.16 I assess
whether and how the law should recognize the process of
becoming a parent.17 This part is divided into two sections to
address the separate components of this inquiry. Section A
discusses whether the law can recognize the indeterminate selfidentification as a parent-to-be.18 Conferring parent-to-be legal
status before birth is in tension with the notion that parental status
comes into existence at the moment of the child’s birth.19 I show
that it is eminently possible for the law to recognize the fluid
status of parent-to-be, and that several of the concerns that might
explain its failure to do so are misguided.20 Section B then
explores how the law should recognize the process of becoming a
parent.21 I consider the kinds of conflicts that may arise during
the process of becoming a parent and show that while the law
addresses certain implications of becoming a parent, its reach is
underinclusive.22 Indeed, I show that by reducing the concept of
becoming a parent to its purely biological (and chiefly
gestational) elements, the law leaves anticipated parents in a
peculiarly vulnerable position.23
Accordingly, I suggest
14. See infra Section II.C.
15. Ayelet Blecher-Prigat, Rethinking Visitation: From a Parental to a Relational
Right, 16 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1, 36 (2009) (citing Margaret Jane Radin, MarketInalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1878-87 (1987)).
16. See infra Part III.
17. See discussion infra Sections III.A, III.B.
18. See infra Section III.A.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 181-94.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 197-213.
21. See infra Section III.B.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 228-43.
23. See infra Section III.B.2.
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cultivating a more inclusive legal understanding that embraces the
construction, rather than merely the (post-birth) existence, of the
parental status and incorporates the relational elements of
becoming a parent, such as social burdens, emotional
involvement, and human investments.
Two notes before presenting the Article’s theoretical basis.
The first relates to methodology. This Article assesses the broadscale occurrence of temporal discrepancy by engaging with three
terrains: family, employment, and medical malpractice.24 While
articulating detailed policy proposals in each of these domains is
beyond the Article’s scope, I discuss how the law could be
restructured and subsequently developed by policymakers in
accordance with the doctrines of each.25 To render my analysis
more concrete, I glean support from existing laws in different
jurisdictions, including U.S. states, Canadian provinces, and
Israel.26 While I do not purport to offer a traditional comparative
legal analysis, I hope that the comparative nature of this Article
can assist policymakers across the globe in making laws more
attentive to the needs of various individuals in their process of
becoming parents.
The second note is on terminology. I use the term
“anticipated parent” in lieu of the common terms “intended
parent” and “prospective parent.” The term “anticipated parent”
designates becoming a parent that this Article offers to elucidate.
I use the term “social parent” in lieu of “non-biological parent” to
avoid affirming terms derived from the bio-normative positions
that I seek to de-naturalize.27 Finally, I use the term “gestational
party” instead of “pregnant mother” to reflect that transgender
men and non-binary people also give birth.28

24. See infra Section III.B.1, III.B.2.
25. See infra Section II.C and notes 247-54, 283-301 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 73-86, 103-14,124, 132-179, 228-9, 238-48, 258, 283-300, and
accompanying text.
27. See Joanna Radbord, Same-Sex Parents and the Law, 33 WINDSOR REV.
LEGAL & SOC. ISSUES 1, 6 (2013).
28. Id. at 1; Preparing for Pregnancy as a Non-Binary Person, FAM. EQUAL.,
[https://perma.cc/5HNK-WPJ9] (last visited Nov. 18, 2021).
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I. THE THEORETICAL FOUNDATION
This part lays down the theoretical framework of temporal
discrepancy that will accompany us throughout the Article. After
situating this Article’s contribution within the legal scholarship,29
I will turn specifically to queer literature on time and explain how
this body of work informs my theoretical framework.30 Finally, I
discuss how my framework both rests on and enriches the current
writing on legal identities.31
Legal scholars have ventured into the territory of time.
While some scholars have considered generally how the law
shapes perceptions of time as a historical, cultural, or political
construct,32 or how temporal logics are utilized to allocate
rights,33 others have considered the construction of time in
specific fields, e.g., human rights,34 criminal law,35 and private
law.36 Despite these growing conversations about time and the
law, the relation between time and the formation of legal
identities, specifically the legal status of parenthood, remains
largely unexamined.37 Further, though most of the legal literature
29. See infra text accompanying notes 32-39.
30. See infra text accompanying notes 40-48.
31. See infra text accompanying notes 49-64.
32. E.g., Carol J. Greenhouse, Just in Time: Temporality and Cultural Legitimation of
Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1631, 1631 (1989); Rebecca R. French, Time in the Law, 72 U. COLO. L.
REV. 663, 664-72 (2001).
33. Liaquat Ali Khan, Temporality of Law, 40 MCGEORGE L. REV. 55, 56-57 (2009);
Frederic Bloom, The Law’s Clock, 104 GEO. L.J. 1, 2-3 (2015).
34. See Orna Ben-Naftali et al., Illegal Occupation: Framing the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, 23 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 551, 554-55 (2005); Yofi Tirosh, The Right to Be Fat,
12 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 264, 301-02 (2012); Kathryn McNeilly, Are Rights
Out of Time?: International Human Rights Law, Temporality, and Radical Social Change,
28 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 817, 817 (2019).
35. See Jonathan Goldberg-Hiller & David T. Johnson, Time and Punishment, 31
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 621, 622 (2013).
36. See Emily Grabham, Doing Things with Time: Flexibility, Adaptability, and
Elasticity in UK Equality Cases, 26 CAN. J.L. & SOC’Y 485, 485-86 (2011); see also Sarah
Keenan, Making Land Liquid: On Time and Title Registration, in LAW AND TIME 145, 157
(Siân M. Beynon-Jones & Emily Grabham, eds., 2019).
37. See John Lawrence Hill, What Does It Mean to Be a “Parent”? The Claims of
Biology as the Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 358 (1991) (“[T]he parental
rights of the intended parents should be legally recognized from the time of conception.”);
Dara E. Purvis, Intended Parents and the Problem of Perspective, 24 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM
210, 211-12, 229-30 (2012) [hereinafter Purvis, Intended Parents] (discussing how parental
intent is used in determining at what point in time parents are legally identified); Courtney

3 NAAMAN.MAN.FIN .DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022

TIMING LEGAL PARENTHOOD

4/13/22 10:04 AM

65

on ART focuses on “who is a parent?” less attention is paid to
when the parental status should be formalized38 and how the
process of becoming a parent is influenced by a particular logic
of time.39 This Article aims to fill that academic gap by giving
these questions much-needed theoretical attention. The value of
queer theory on time to our conversation will become clear below.
Queer scholarship on time calls attention to how time is
organized in accordance with the logic of (hetero)normativity,
which features principles such as linearity, capitalist
accumulation, and productivity, and is represented by
(hetero)normative models of lives.40 In so doing, this scholarship
prompts us (1) to consider how non-normative embodiments that
are out of social sync are marginalized and oppressed, and (2) to
assess how self-identifications or embodiments that move beyond
and against the normative and ostensibly objective and universal
G. Joslin, (Not) Just Surrogacy, 109 CAL L. REV. 401, 439-442 (2021) [hereinafter Joslin,
(Not) Just Surrogacy] (assessing the option of establishing the parental status before the
child’s birth in surrogacy arrangements).
38. Id. at 210, 214-5 (pointing to the gap between the legal principles of parentage
determination that look backward in time and the perception of people undergoing ART who
seek to “manifest their intent to become parents with a forward-looking temporal
perspective, before a child is conceived and born.”). While Purvis’s analysis views the
discrepancy between legal principles and self-perceptions in terms of directions, my analysis
focuses on the discrepancy between the construction of self-identification and legal
identification.
39. For scholarship that theorizes the significance of the period of pregnancy for
women, see Jennifer S. Hendricks, Body and Soul: Equality, Pregnancy, and the Unitary
Right to Abortion, 45 HARV. C.R.-C. L. L. REV. 329, 331-32 (2010); see also Siân M.
Beynon-Jones, Timing is Everything: The Demarcation of ‘Later’ Abortions in Scotland, 42
SOC. STUD. SCI. 53, 53 (2012). My analysis is distinct from this scholarship in that it focuses
on both the gestational and relational elements of becoming a parent, while these scholars
focus mostly on the former. See also Kaiponanea T. Matsumura, Binding Future Selves, 75
LA. L. REV. 71, 77, 119 (2014) (assessing why the person’s earlier commitment (the “earlier
self”) does not bind the person’s will at the time of enforcement (the “later self”) in the
context of agreements pertaining to affairs of surrogacy and embryos). While Matsumura’s
analysis focuses on two decisive moments, the earlier and later selves, I focus on a broader
period of time during which the self as a parent develops.
40. This logic has been articulated in similar, though not identical, manners, by
theories, such as Lee Edelman in his concept of “reproductive futurism[,]” Jack Halberstam
in his concept of “repro-time[,]” and Elizabeth Freeman in her concept of
“chrononormativity[.]” LEE EDELMAN, NO FUTURE: QUEER THEORY AND THE DEATH
DRIVE 2 (Michèle Aina Barale, et al. eds., 2004); JACK HALBERSTAM, IN A QUEER TIME
AND PLACE: TRANSGENDER BODIES, SUBCULTURAL LIVES 5, 10 (José Esteban Muñoz &
Ann Pellegrini eds., 2005) [hereinafter HALBERSTAM, IN A QUEER TIME]; ELIZABETH
FREEMAN, TIME BINDS: QUEER TEMPORALITIES, QUEER HISTORIES 3 (2010).
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logic of time offer creative possibilities for understanding and
experiencing time.41
This stance is prominent in Jack Halberstam’s work, which
urges its readers to explore lives that break from heterosexual life
narratives, such as “bourgeois reproduction” and family,42 and
instead evolve from childhood in a trajectory that Kathryn
Stockton describes as “growing sideways.”43 Edelman also
addresses that break, exhorting us to remove ourselves from
political thinking about the future, which he laments as
misleading, and to embrace a nihilistic sensibility that rejects
investment in any future-oriented optimism.44 As opposed to
Edelman, José Muñoz offers a constructive view of time by
presenting the internal mode of “not yet here.”45 This encourages
the subject to think about time in an untimely manner, beyond the
linear relationship between past, present, and future, thus
allowing the subject to liberate himself from the disciplining
effects of time and to engage with a utopian vision that embraces
unpredictable possibilities.46 Viewed as a whole, queer writing
demonstrates how individuals can live beyond, and in spite of, the
rigid boundaries of time, elucidating the concept I term “temporal
discrepancy.”47
41. Elizabeth Freeman, Introduction, 13 GLQ 159, 159-160 (2007).
42. HALBERSTAM, IN A QUEER TIME, supra note 40, at 6; JUDITH HALBERSTAM, THE
QUEER ART OF FAILURE 70 (2011).
43. KATHRYN BOND STOCKTON, THE QUEER CHILD, OR GROWING SIDEWAYS IN THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY 11 (Michèle Aina Barale, et al. eds., 2009).
44. EDELMAN, supra note 40, at 4, 14, 30-31. This sensibility is further echoed in the
psychoanalytic writing on the practice of barebacking among gay men—which advances a
perspective on the future that health is imperative, resists the desire to live longer, and
expresses a disdain for the institutional rhythm of progress and breeding. See TIM DEAN,
UNLIMITED INTIMACY: REFLECTIONS ON THE SUBCULTURE OF BAREBACKING 66 (2009);
LEO BERSANI & ADAM PHILLIPS, INTIMACIES 45-46, 114, 122 (2008).
45. JOSÉ ESTEBAN MUÑOZ, CRUISING UTOPIA: THE THEN AND THERE OF QUEER
FUTURITY 22 (José Esteban & Ann Perregrini, eds., 2009).
46. Id. at 22-23, 194 n.7.
47. I am mindful that some of the views expressed in these writings, specifically the
disdain for breeding (see generally EDELMAN, NO FUTURE, supra note 40), the utopian
visions of an unpredictable future (MUÑOZ supra note 45, at 21-23) and suicidal ideology
(BERSANI & PHILLIPS, supra note 44, at 35; DEAN, supra note 44, at 66), are at odds with
procreative objectives and concerns for the stability and integrity of non-normative families.
However, I draw on this writing as it explicitly unpacks how non-normative kinships are
repressed by institutional forms of time, exemplifying what I identify as temporal
discrepancy, and because of their potential to exhort us thinking differently on time.
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Temporal discrepancy is the gap between how an individual
identifies or perceives himself (the internal sphere) and how that
identification or embodiment is counted by norms (the
institutional sphere). It occurs at moments in time when an
individual’s lived experience is out of sync with the events that
society perceives—and the law recognizes—as milestones.
Mobilizing this understanding of time as governing certain
embodiments into the context of legal parenthood expands the
assertation that family kinship itself is an instrument of subject
formation that differentiates subjects.48 Careful attention to the
relation between time and subjectification is thus needed to
ensure the law is on track with notions of social justice.
This suggested theoretical framework builds also on the
literature of legal identities. Legal identities are formed by
practices that confer a legal status upon an individual who claims
an identity.49 Practices, such as documentary actions (e.g.,
signing paperwork) or ceremonial actions (e.g., weddings),
effectuate what Jessica Clarke theorizes as the moment of
“formalization.”50 At that moment, the law actualizes the selfidentification of the individual, representing the moment when
people first experience their identities as “real.”51 This Article
concerns moments during which the legal and self-identifications
are out of sync because the construction of the self-identification
in relation to a particular status begins or completes before its
formalization.52 While Clarke comprehensively analyzes the
risks and benefits resulting from the formalization of legal
identities, she does not tackle the period of time that I am
concerned with, namely, the period before the moment of
formalization.53 Viewing Clarke’s observations through the lens
of queer theories on time can enrich her analysis, as they clear
space for thinking about becoming in non-traditional ways, which
are not necessarily inherent in an institutional logic of time.54
48. Judith Butler, Is Kinship Always Already Heterosexual?, 13 FEM. CULT. STUD. 14,
31-32 (2002).
49. Jessica A. Clarke, Identity and Form, 103 CAL. L. REV. 747, 755-56 (2015).
50. Id. at 753, 756 (emphasis added).
51. Id. at 806.
52. See infra Parts II-III.
53. See Clarke, supra note 49, at 750-54.
54. See infra notes 308-09 and accompanying text.
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I focus on two forms of temporal discrepancy: post-birth
temporal discrepancy and pre-birth temporal discrepancy. The
first refers to a gap in time in which an individual’s selfidentification is established, but the legal identification is still “tobe.”55 That legal status is still “to-be” because the law has yet to
confer a legal status on the individual.56 In the context of
parenthood, such a discrepancy appears at birth and is sustained
afterward when the parental status of the anticipated social parent
is yet to be formalized.57 The second form of temporal
discrepancy refers to the moments at which an individual’s selfidentification is still developing.58 That period can be viewed as
a trajectory of “becoming” throughout which the selfidentification fluctuates, or moves on a spectrum between a
certain starting point and a designated position, which is invisible
from a legal perspective.59
This invisibility produces a
discrepancy between the development of self-identification and
the stagnation of legal identification.60 In the context of
parenthood, such a gap occurs before birth when an individual
perceives himself as a parent-to-be, but his “to-be” status—i.e.,
the dynamic mode of becoming a parent—does not fit neatly into
any legally cognizable category.61 The similarity between the two
scenarios is that both produce a discrepancy between the
temporality of the internal sphere (the self-identification) and that
of the external sphere (the legal identification).62 In the first
scenario, however, the discrepancy is grounded in the difference
between the “already there” self-identification and the “to-be”
legal-identification, while in the second, the discrepancy lies in
the gap between the “to-be” self-identification and the ambiguous
legal identification.63 In other words, in the first scenario, the

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

See discussion infra Part II.
See infra notes 75-84 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 75-84 and accompanying text.
See discussion infra Part III.
See infra notes 181-94, 214-27 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 193-94 and accompanying text.
See discussion infra Section III.A.
See infra notes 188-94 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 78-84 and accompanying text.
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legal identification is the “to-be,” while in the second, it is the
self-identification itself that is “to-be.”64
II. POST-BIRTH TEMPORAL DISCREPANCY
The birth of a child legally signifies “the birth of a parent.”65
If the child is conceived by sex-based conception, the parental
status of the biological parent(s) is formalized through
registration, which usually occurs immediately after the child’s
birth.66 By contrast, in cases of ART, e.g., sperm donation or
surrogacy, the status may not be formalized until several months
(if not years) after the birth, resulting in a temporal discrepancy
between the self and legal identifications.67 This part analyzes
this discrepancy in three sections: the first outlines its contours;68
the second examines its implications;69 and the third evaluates the
regulatory avenues needed to mitigate these implications.70
A. The Contours of Temporal Discrepancy
When, and to what degree, does a parent experience
temporal discrepancy?
Reviewing the laws in various
jurisdictions illustrates that the answer is contingent on three

64. The forms of temporal discrepancy I discuss here are not exhaustive of all
circumstances in which temporal discrepancy between self and legal identification might
exist. In relation to parenthood, there are two forms of temporal discrepancy that mirror the
forms outlined here. One form occurs after birth. Take, for example, a woman who gives
birth and is legally considered a mother but refuses to embrace motherhood and rejects that
legal identification. The second form happens before birth, as in the example of a pregnant
woman who does not regard herself as an anticipated parent but may be legally recognized
as such and thus entitled to special rights by virtue of her future parental status.
65. See Ayelet Blecher-Prigat, Conceiving Parents, 41 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 119, 120
(2018) [hereinafter Blecher-Prigat, Conceiving Parents].
66. Shohreh Davoodi, More Than a Piece of Paper: Same-Sex Parents and Their
Adopted Children Are Entitled to Equal Protection in the Realm of Birth Certificates, 90
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 703, 707 (2015) (stating that the birth certificate certifies parenthood);
see also infra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
67. See infra notes 76-86 and accompanying text.
68. See infra Section II.A.
69. See infra Section II.B.
70. See infra Section II.C.
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factors: the method of conception, the sex of the parents, and their
marital status.71 I survey the operation of these factors.
When a birth results from a sexual union, the default rule
under Anglo-American law is that the woman who bears the child
is the mother.72 The woman’s husband will be considered as the
legal parent already at the birth, either based on marital
presumption,73 or on his genetic relation to the child.74 If the
parties are not married, the parental status of the birth parent’s
partner may be contingent on a written form provided soon after
the birth, if not already at the hospital, declaring that the partner
is the legal parent.75
If the child is conceived through anonymous sperm
donation, the formalization of parental status may depend on the
parties’ sexes and their marital status.76 In the case of married,
71. My purpose is not to provide a comparative analysis of parentage determination,
which is beyond the scope of this Article, but instead to exemplify the various factors that
may determine the occurrence of temporal discrepancy.
72. David D. Meyer, Parenthood in a Time of Transition: Tensions Between Legal,
Biological, and Social Conceptions of Parenthood, 54 AM. J. COMPAR. L. (SUPPLEMENT
ISSUE) 125, 127 (2006) [hereinafter Meyer, Parenthood].
73. In the United States, historically, the woman’s husband has been deemed the
parent, regardless of whether he is the child’s genetic parent, even when proof exists that the
husband is not the biological father, and this presumption remains the most common way of
establishing parentage of the husband. See Katharine K. Baker, Legitimate Families and
Equal Protection, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1647, 1658-59 (2015) [hereinafter Baker, Legitimate
Families]; Douglas NeJaime, The Nature of Parenthood, 123 YALE L.J. 2260, 2266 (2017)
[hereinafter NeJaime, Nature]. That presumption is also common in Canada and England.
See Wanda Wiegers, Fatherhood and Misattributed Genetic Paternity in Family Law, 36
QUEEN’S L.J. 623, 640 (2011); Gillian R. Chadwick, Legitimating the Transnational Family,
42 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 257, 280 (2019).
74. Even in these jurisdictions (like in Israel), in practice, the law infers biological
paternity through marital presumption. Noy Naaman, Ayelet Blecher-Prigat, Ruth Zafran,
Parenthood Based on Relationship: Dual Motherhood as a Case Study, 36 TEL-AVIV U. L.
REV. (Iyunei Mishpat) (forthcoming) (Hebrew), available at [https://perma.cc/99QV-2BFC]
(last visited Feb. 21, 2022).
75. In the United States, the unmarried partner of the birth mother can become the legal
father of the child through a voluntary acknowledgement of paternity (“VAP”). The VAP
procedure is generally limited to identifying the man alleged to be the child’s genetic father
(though some states’ VAP forms are silent as to the genetic relationship between the male
signatory and the child), and the mother needs to declare that she was not married to anyone
when the child was born or at any time during the 300 days prior to the birth. See Jeffrey A.
Parness & Zachary Townsend, For Those Not John Edwards: More and Better Paternity
Acknowledgments at Birth, 40 U. BALT. L. REV. 53, 70, 72 (2010); Paternity/Parentage
Establishment, DEL. HEALTH & SOC. SERVS., [https://perma.cc/776S-KJRR] (last visited
Nov. 20, 2021).
76. NeJaime, Nature, supra note 73, at 2296-97.
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different-sex couples, when the wife gives birth to a child
conceived through artificial insemination by an anonymous
sperm donor, in many jurisdictions, the husband is automatically
registered as the father by virtue of the marital presumption.77 If
the parents are unmarried, however, the formalization process
varies; in certain jurisdictions, parentage may be attributed to the
male partner through automatic registration by virtue of his quasimarital relationship with the birth mother78 or consent to raise the
child with the biological mother,79 while in others, the partner
must invoke post-birth judicial procedures to be legally
recognized as the father,80 or live with the newborn for some
amount of time, resulting in temporal discrepancy between the
establishment of the self as a parent and the law’s recognition of
the parent as such.81 In the case of same-sex couples, while in
77. Meyer, Parenthood, supra note 72, at 134.
78. The laws in British Columbia, Ontario, Saskatchewan adopted this scheme. See
Family Law Act, S.B.C. 2011, c 25, § 27 (Can.); All Families Are Equal Act (Parentage and
Related Registrations Statute Law Amendment), S.O. 2016, c 23, § 8 (Can.); The Children’s
Law Act, S.S. 2020, c 2, § 60 (Can.). In these jurisdictions, the statutes apply equally to all
couples regardless of their sexual orientation.
79. In British Columbia, for example, see Family Law Act, S.B.C. 2011, c 25, § 30(b)
(Can.). In Ontario for example, see All Families Are Equal Act (Parentage and Related
Registrations Statute Law Amendment) S.O. 2016, c 23, § 9 (Can.). In Saskatchewan, see
The Children’s Law Act, S.S. 2020, c 2, § 61 (4)(b) (Can.). In the United States, as a matter
of law, only “[i]n a few states, nonbiological intended parents are authorized to establish
parentage through a voluntary acknowledgment of parentage.” See Douglas NeJaime, Who
Is a Parent?, 43 FAM. ADVOC. 6, 8-9 (2021). In practice, however, the couple can easily
bypass this procedure. Specifically, though the paternity form requires the birth mother and
the putative father to attest that the male partner is the genetic father, and though in certain
jurisdictions they do so under penalty of perjury, the form is not scrutinized, and there is no
practical means for inquiring into the use of sperm donation. For further reading on the place
of biology in establishing legal parenthood through the execution of a VAP, see Baker,
Legitimate Families, supra note 73, at 1686-87; Jeffrey A. Parness, Faithful Parents: Choice
of Childcare Parentage Laws, 70 MERCER L. REV. 325, 345 (2019).
80. As for states in the United States which adopted this scheme, see NeJaime, Nature,
supra note 73, at 2296-97, 2297 n.182, 2370-72. This is also the case in Israel. See Noy
Naaman, Israel: Judicial Parental Order as a Means of Recognizing Same-Sex Parenthood,
in 2021 INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILY LAW 273 (Margaret Brinig ed., 2021)
[hereinafter Naaman, Parental Order]; PROFESSIONAL COMMITTEE TO REVIEW CRITERIA
FOR THE ISSUANCE OF THE JUDICIAL PARENTAL ORDER (INTER-MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE),
[https://perma.cc/QRW6-Z7R3] (last visited Nov. 21, 2021) [hereinafter INTERMINISTERIAL COMMITTEE GUIDELINES]. In practice, however, different-sex couple can
easily bypass this procedure. See supra note 79; cf. Noy Naaman, The Paradox of same-sex
Parentage Equality, 100(1) WASH. U.L. REV. (forthcoming 2022).
81. Under the Uniform Parentage Act (“UPA”), for example, a parental status may vest
in the biological parent’s partner after two years of cohabitation, but it also furthers the goal
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some jurisdictions, the marital (or quasi-marital) presumption is
applied to formalize the parental status of the same-sex partner
immediately upon the birth,82 in other jurisdictions, the parentage
is established through post-birth judicial procedures, resulting in
a formalization of the status that occurs remotely in time from the
birth.83
Temporal discrepancy can also occur in the context of
surrogacy. The duration of that discrepancy depends on the
governing legal framework. In some jurisdictions, the parental
status of the anticipated parents is formalized only after the
issuance of a post-birth parental order that may be granted
remotely in time after birth.84 In others, by contrast, the
anticipated parents are already registered as such by the time of
the birth, either through pre-birth (judicial or administrative)
procedure,85 or by marital presumption applied at the birth,86
preventing any temporal discrepancy.

of establishing parentage quickly and with certainty. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a)(2)
(NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE L. 2017).
82. In the United States, see COURTNEY G. JOSLIN ET AL., LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL,
AND TRANSGENDER FAMILY LAW, § 3:5, at 173 (2021); Nejaime, Nature, supra note 73, at
2294, 2339, 2363-66. In the United States, the UPA revised the VAP process so that it can
be used to establish the parental status of a “presumed parent” other than the “genetic father”
or “intended parent[.]” UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 301 (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF.
STATE L. 2017). Similarly, some states include a gender-neutral VAP system in cases of
ART. Courtney G. Joslin, Nurturing Parenthood Through the UPA (2017), 127 YALE J.L &
FEMINISM 589, 604 (2018). While the establishment of the parental status in such cases does
not occur automatically on the moment the child is born, it allows establishing parentage
immediately after the birth without the need to undergo a court proceeding, a process that
could render the discrepancy between the construction of the self and of legal identification
more perceptible. Id. at 605.
83. The law as it exists in Israel is an illustrative example for this scheme. Naaman,
Parental Order, supra note 80, at 273.
84. In Israel, for example, same-sex couples, are subject to post-birth procedures,
which may take several months. If the couple fails to fulfill the criteria for parental orders,
they may be navigated to a second-parent adoption, which can take several years. Id. at 27275.
85. See infra notes 135-146 and accompanying text.
86. The New York appellate court recently applied the marital presumption to the
biological father’s same-sex spouse where the child was born via surrogacy during the
marriage. See In re Maria-Irene D., 153 A.D.3d 1203, 1205 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017).
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B. The Implications of Temporal Discrepancy
In this section, I explore three types of temporal
discrepancies that are created when the formalization of the
parental status occurs remotely in time after the birth. The first,
inner sphere, implicates the self-continuity of the parent;87 the
second, interpersonal sphere, involves the familial dynamic;88
and the third, collective sphere, refers to the relationship among
families.89 By highlighting the crippling effects in each sphere
caused by delays in the formalization of the parental relationship,
I illustrate how the law deploys time to police and oppress the
becoming of non-normative families.
1. The Inner Sphere
The inner sphere refers to the construction of an individual’s
self-identification. Temporal discrepancy affects the inner sphere
by disrupting the development of an individual’s selfidentification as an anticipated parent—that is, the state of a
constant self-continuity beginning at the moment of a mutual
decision to conceive, continuing through fertilization and
impregnation, and becoming complete at the birth.90 The
discontinuity between the self and legal-identifications adversely
affects the individual’s self-determination in a manner that may
be particularly significant given the importance of parental status
in shaping our personhood.91

87. See infra Section II.B.1.
88. See infra Section II.B.2.
89. See infra Section II.B.3.
90. This account does not apply to unplanned or unwanted pregnancies, which are
outside the scope of this Article. This account does not ignore the presumption that after the
birth, the self-identification of a person as a parent constantly shapes throughout his life.
91. John A. Robertson, Liberalism and the Limits of Procreative Liberty: A Response
to My Critics, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 233, 236 (1995); Harry Brighouse & Adam Swift,
Parents’ Rights and the Value of the Family, 117 ETHICS 80, 91-95 (2006). For further
reading on identity formation of same-sex families, Kimberly Richman, Lovers, Legal
Strangers, and Parents: Negotiating Parental and Sexual Identity in Family Law, 36 L. &
SOC’Y REV. 285, 286-87 (2002); Irene Padavic & Jonniann Butterfield, Mothers, Fathers,
and “Mathers”: Negotiating a Lesbian Co-parental Identity, 25 GENDER & SOC’Y 176, 18182 (2011). Abbie E. Goldberg et al., Why Parenthood, and Why Now? Gay Men’s
Motivations for Pursuing Parenthood, 61 FAM. RELS. 157, 160 (2012).
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The theory of narrative identity illuminates my argument
regarding the effects of temporal discrepancy. This theory
regards the formation of an individual’s identity as occurring
through narrative: a story about oneself that one tells oneself and
others.92 That story allows the individual to develop a selfperception as a “well-defined character[,]”93 creating a “sense of
meaning[] that unfold[s] in and through time.”94 That is, the
formation of an individual’s identity is suffused with the lifenarrative he builds.
The theory of narrative identity is relevant for its emphasis
on the role of continuity in the process of forming the selfnarrative. Continuity allows an individual to anticipate and
control his narrative95 and facilitates the capability to pursue his
goals and become the person he wishes to be,96 enabling him to
“function as [an] intentional agent[].”97 Psychological scholars
maintain that self-continuity is intertwined with cultural
contingencies, namely that the realization of the self is informed
by how temporality is “represented within the symbolic web of
. . . culture.”98 From that point of view, one can perceive how
delaying the legal recognition of parental status until well after
birth, the moment that culturally signifies the birth of parenthood,
interferes with the organic dynamic of self-continuity and
impedes an individual’s ability to experience his selfidentification as “real[.]”99
Studies of same-sex families offer additional insights into
how temporal discrepancy can interfere with individual narrative
formation. Studies on lesbian couples, for example, reveal that
92. Paul Ricoeur, Narrative Identity, 35 PHIL. TODAY 73, 77 (1991); MARYA
SCHECHTMAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF SELVES 93-95 (1996).
93. Id.; SCHECHTMAN, supra note 92, at 97.
94. Peter Brooks, The Law as Narrative and Rhetoric, in LAW’S STORIES: NARRATIVE
AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 14 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz, eds., 1996).
95. See Martha Minow, Stories in Law, in LAW’S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND
RHETORIC IN THE LAW, supra note 94, at 33.
96. See DAVID DEGRAZIA, HUMAN IDENTITY AND BIOETHICS 80 (2005).
97. Russell Spears, Commenting on Continuity: A View from Social Psychology, in
SELF CONTINUITY: INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE PERSPECTIVES 251, 254 (Fabio Sani ed.,
2008).
98. Romin W. Tafarodi, Toward a Cultural Phenomenology of Personal Identity, in
SELF CONTINUITY: INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE PERSPECTIVES, supra note 97, at 33.
99. Clarke, supra note 49, at 753.
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the lack of official recognition may lead the social mother to
experience high levels of stress and uncertainty while negotiating
her maternal identity with herself.100 This perceived limitation on
self-determination is reinforced in everyday interactions with
third parties in which the social mother is deprived of the right to
operate on behalf of her child.101 Other recent studies illustrate
how impeding the recognition of the social parent forces the
family to operate in an environment marked by “confusion and
social apprehension” and to adopt strategies to anticipate and
defuse potential conflicts.102
2. The Interpersonal Sphere
The interpersonal sphere refers to the dynamic within the
family, namely the relationship between the parents and the child
(the vertical relationship) and the relationship between the parents
(the horizontal relationship). Scholars over the past two decades
have demonstrated that legal recognition allows parents to fulfill
their parental responsibilities without obstruction and ensure the
stability, security, and continuity of the parent-child
relationship,103 which is important for the child’s ability to
achieve self-fulfillment and form other meaningful relationships

100. See, e.g., Michele M. McKelvey, The Other Mother: A Narrative Analysis of the
Postpartum Experiences of Nonbirth Lesbian Mothers, 37 ADVANCES NURSING SCI. 101,
101-02 (2014); Danuta M. Wojnar & Amy Katzenmeyer, Experiences of Preconception,
Pregnancy, and New Motherhood for Lesbian Nonbiological Mothers, 43 J. OBSTETRIC,
GYNECOLOGIC & NEONATAL NURSING 50, 59 (2014); ALONA PELEG, LESBIAN
MOTHERHOOD IN ISRAEL 132-34 (Stavit Sinai ed., 2020) (Isr.).
101. See McKelvey, supra note 100, at 112-13; Wojnar & Katzenmeyer, supra note
100, at 53-55, 58-59; PELEG, supra note 100, at 132-34.
102. Alison Gash & Judith Raiskin, Parenting Without Protection: How Legal Status
Ambiguity Affects Lesbian and Gay Parenthood, 43 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 82, 84, 112 (2018).
These strategies include carrying documented proof of parentage or creating a narrative that
children can use when their familial status is questioned. Id.; Emily Kazyak et al., Law and
Family Formation Among LGBQ-Parent Families, 56 FAM. CT. REV. 364, 368 (2018).
103. JUNE CARBONE, FROM PARTNERS TO PARENTS: THE SECOND REVOLUTION IN
FAMILY LAW 111–119 (2000) (discussing the benefits of stability in child-parent
relationships); ANNE L. ALSTOTT, NO EXIT: WHAT PARENTS OWE THEIR CHILDREN AND
WHAT SOCIETY OWES PARENTS 15-20, 45-47 (2004) (discussing benefits of continuity of
care for children and society); Wanda Wiegers, Assisted Conception and Equality of Familial
Status in Parentage Law, 28 CANADIAN J. FAM. L. 147, 149 (2012).
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in life.104 Legal recognition also allows both parent and child to
benefit from an array of financial safeguards, such as employment
benefits, insurance, and inheritance.105 Delaying or impeding
parental recognition, therefore, disadvantages parents and
children both emotionally and financially.106
Furthermore, by not recognizing the social parent upon birth,
the law carves out a hierarchy between the biological parent and
the social parent in relation to the child.107 The social parent
experiences the tangible effects of this hierarchy when he or she
is subjected to an inspection process by a multitude of
institutional actors including judges, state attorneys, and,
sometimes, welfare officers.108 The judicial process, especially
when it operates after the birth, inherently treats the social
parental bond as an artificial or inauthentic kinship that is subject
to intrusive scrutiny.109
Some jurisdictions perpetuate that hierarchy even after
official recognition by refusing to correct the birth certificate so
that it lists the social parent’s name.110 As a public record of facts
104. Ya’ir Ronen, Redefining the Child’s Right to Identity, 18 INT’L J. L., POL’Y &
FAM. 147, 154 (2004) (discussing the importance of these relationships to the child’s sense
of belonging); see also Angela Campbell, Conceiving Parents Through Law, 21 INT’L J. L.
POL’Y & FAM. 242, 265 (2007) (emphasizing that the legal recognition of the social parent
fosters the child’s self-awareness, dignity and belonging within his community); Alison Bird,
Legal Parenthood and the Recognition of Alternative Family Forms in Canada, 60 U. N.B.
L. J. 264, 285 (2010) (criticizing Canadian courts for ignoring “the symbolic importance of
legal recognition to a child’s sense of identity”).
105. Melanie B. Jacobs, Micah Has One Mommy and One Legal Stranger:
Adjudicating Maternity for Nonbiological Lesbian Coparents, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 341, 34647 (2002); Courtney G. Joslin, Travel Insurance: Protecting Lesbian and Gay Parent
Families Across State Lines, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 31, 32 (2010) [hereinafter Joslin,
Travel Insurance].
106. See Jacobs, supra note 105, at 346-47; Joslin, Travel Insurance, supra note 105,
at 32.
107. See also infra text accompanying notes 115-18.
108. See also infra text accompanying notes 115-18.
109. See also infra text accompanying notes 115-18.
110. In Israel, for example, when a same-sex female couple conceives through
anonymous sperm donation, only the biological parent’s name is listed on the birth
certificate. See Ilan Lior, Israel Defies Ruling to Register Same-Sex Parents on Children’s
Birth Certificates, HAARETZ (Apr. 10, 2018), [https://perma.cc/U8V6-XGY6] (last visited
Nov. 22, 2021). By contrast, numerous jurisdictions in the United States and Canada allow
both parents in same-sex families to be listed on the birth certificate. See Elizabeth J.
Samuels, An Immodest Proposal for Birth Registration in Donor-Assisted Reproduction, in
the Interest of Science and Human Rights, 48 N.M. L. REV. 416, 428-29 (2018); Fiona Kelly,
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that define how we present ourselves to the world, the certificate
of birth registration begins the life story of who we are; in that
sense, it is constitutive of our identities and of our family life
narratives, especially insofar as it identifies our parents.111 From
a practical standpoint, the birth certificate is also what most
people rely on to provide evidence of parental status when dealing
with schools, health-care providers, state-provided services,
border crossings, and other third parties.112 The fact that this
document is required for a wide range of activities and services
underscores its importance.113 Therefore, the absence of the
social parent’s name from that public, yet very personal,
document routinely erases that parent in day-to-day interactions.
The omission of a parent from the birth certificate could have
substantial adverse effects. In cases of medical emergencies, for
example, the social parent may be deprived of the right to make
any decision or to be involved in a child’s medical care.114
The derogatory effect of this hierarchy is especially salient
when viewed alongside social research concerning same-sex
families. Studies have reported on maternal jealousy within
lesbian families in which only one parent has a biological link to
the child,115 as well as a power imbalance between the mothers
concerning the ability to make decisions regarding their
children.116 By delaying or impeding the legal recognition of the
social parent, and by creating, through the birth certificate, a
hierarchy with legal and practical significance based on biological
(Re)forming Parenthood: The Assignment of Legal Parentage Within Planned Lesbian
Families, 40 OTTAWA L. REV. 185, 192 (2008).
111. Anna Marie D’Ginto, Comment, The Birth Certificate Solution: Ensuring the
Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Parentage, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 975, 1001-02 (2019).
112. Davoodi, supra note 66, at 708; D’Ginto, supra note 111, at 1002.
113. D’Ginto, supra note 111, at 1002.
114. Id. For further reading on other harms inflicted on families who lack birth
certificates accurately reflecting their child’s legal parentage, see Motion for Leave to File
Brief of Amicus Curiae Family Law Professors in Support of Petitioners and Brief of Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 9-17, Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075 (2017) (No. 16992).
115. Suzanne Pelka, Sharing Motherhood: Maternal Jealousy Among Lesbian CoMothers, 56 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 195, 196 (2009); Claudia Ciano-Boyce & Lynn ShelleySireci, Who Is Mommy Tonight? Lesbian Parenting Issues, 43 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 1, 10-11
(2002).
116. See McKelvey, supra note 100 at 108; Wojnar & Katzenmeyer, supra note 100,
at 58-59.
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differences, the law entrenches or even exacerbates these internal
conflicts within families. This outcome produces a paradox:
precisely in those families that depart from the heteronormative
model premised on biological kinship, and that rely on alternative
procreative arrangements due to the biological constraints of
same-sex reproduction,117 biology becomes the key factor
shaping their dynamic.118 Rather than perpetuate this negative
dynamic, the law should facilitate familial stability for the benefit
of all family members.
Such a hierarchy between biological and social parenthood
becomes all the more apparent in cases of dissolution that occur
before the social parent’s parental status is formalized. In such
scenarios, temporal discrepancy may situate the social parent in a
vulnerable position by providing an unjust advantage to the
biological parent, who might seek to deny him custodial,
visitation, or other rights with respect to the child.119 In the
absence of a legally recognized parent-child relationship, the
social parent may find himself barred from making decisions
relating to the child.120 Conversely, a social parent may disclaim
responsibility for the child more easily than the biological parent,
leaving the child with the support of only the latter.121 Instead of
facilitating these imbalances, we should expect the law to place
both parents on equal footing as soon as possible after birth.

117. Scholars have long discussed how intent—rather than biology—has a meaningful
role in the family arrangements of same-sex kinship. See, e.g., Tarsh Bates, The Queer
Temporality of CandidaHomo Biotechnocultures, 34 AUSTRALIAN FEMINIST STUDS. 25, 33
(2019). This is not to say that biology plays no role at all in same-sex families, but for samesex couples, biological kinship may be less significant than for different-sex couples. For
the opposite view, see Michael Boucai, Is Assisted Procreation an LGBT Right?, 2016 WIS.
L. REV. 1065, 1083 (2016) (discussing the importance for gay people of a genetic parental
bond). This is also the case in Israel, see Noy Naaman, Bordering Legal Parenthood, 33(2)
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. SECTION (forthcoming 2022).
118. See, e.g., Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining
Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional
Families, 78 GEO. L. J. 459, 475-76 (1990).
119. As Nancy Polikoff wrote more than three decades ago, without formalizing the
child-parent relationship, a person “may even be found without standing to challenge
parental custody.” Id. at 471-73; Kelly, supra note 110, at 191 nn.17, 20 (referring to
Canadian cases in which, during this waiting period, the biological mother refused to consent
to the social mother adopting her child).
120. See Polikoff, supra note 118, at 471.
121. See id.
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Challenges to the social parent’s relationship to the child
may also arise in the event the biological parent dies before the
social parent’s parental status is formalized.
In such
circumstances, there is no guarantee that the social parent would
be allowed to continue to raise the child.122 “One can . . . readily
envision the potential conflict[s] between” the social parent and
the parents or other kin of the deceased biological parent, who
may feel entitled to take over the parental role and either adopt
the child or become the child’s legal guardians.123
3. The Collective Sphere
The third sphere, the collective, refers to relationships
among different families. Temporal discrepancy in this context
produces systematic differences between different-sex couples
who conceive via sexual intercourse and whose parental status is
characterized by “natural” temporal congruence and same-sex
couples for whom the status of one or both parents is established
remotely in time from the birth.124 Recognizing only biological
parents at the child’s birth puts same-sex couples at a
disadvantage relative to different-sex couples.125 That difference
“countenance[s] a second-class status” for the children of samesex couples whose familial stability, and emotional and financial

122. Leslie Joan Harris, Voluntary Acknowledgements of Parentage for Same Sex
Couples, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 467, 468 (2012).
123. Ruth Zafran, More Than One Mother: Determining Maternity for the Biological
Child of a Female Same-Sex Couple—The Israeli View, 9 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 115, 137
n.117 (2008). If the biological parent sets up a guardianship clause in his will naming his
partner as caregiver in the event of his death, this may address these concerns.
124. In certain jurisdictions, the conferral of the nonmarital genetic father’s parentage
does not occur automatically. See supra note 82; see also Courtney G. Joslin, Protecting
Children(?): Marriage, Gender, and Assisted Reproductive Technology, 83 S. CAL. L. REV.
1177, 1187 (2010) [hereinafter Joslin, Protecting Children(?)]. However, in these cases, the
parental recognition occurs via a simple procedure of signing a form at the hospital,
immediately after the child’s birth, and without the need to undergo a court proceeding, a
process that could render the discrepancy between the construction of the self and of legal
identification more perceptible. Parness & Townsend, supra note 75, at 57.
125. See D’Ginto, supra note 111, at 1001-02.
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security are impaired as compared to the children of “traditional
families.”126
As noted above, temporal discrepancy in the context of
procreation through ART does not affect same-sex couples
exclusively.127 Nevertheless, this group is disproportionately
impacted given that most same-sex couples cannot conceive a
child genetically related to both parents.128 In jurisdictions that
limit the marital presumption or VAPs (available for unmarried
couples) to different-sex couples, the law creates systematic
differences between different-sex couples and lesbian couples
who conceive through sperm donation.129 The disadvantageous
treatment of lesbian couples comes sharply into focus by
comparison with either unmarried male partners of biological
mothers, who may be designated as the child’s father without
evidence that he is in fact the biological father,130 or male spouses
of biological mothers who may be designated as the child’s father
through the marital presumption, even in the face of evidence that
he is not in fact the child’s biological father.131
Viewing these three spheres together illustrates that the
moment of formalization affects a parent’s self-authorship as well
as familial stability, emotional bonds, and financial safeguards.
These elements set forth the very conditions under which family
arrangements can be formed, be sustained, and flourish.
Impeding parental recognition, therefore, is particularly harmful
to the becoming of families.
C. Bridging the Gap
Equipped with the foregoing observations about the adverse
implications of temporal discrepancy, we now turn to evaluate the
126. Nancy Polikoff, A Mother Should Not Have to Adopt Her Own Child: Parentage
Laws for Children of Lesbian Couples in the Twenty-First Century, 5 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L.
201, 225-26 (2009).
127. See supra Section II.A.
128. Indeed, in some circumstances, the parties in same-sex couples are both
biologically related to the offspring. Take, for example, female same-sex couples who
conceive a child via reciprocal in-vitro fertilization, in which one woman gestates the embryo
and the other provides the ovum.
129. See Parness & Townsend, supra note 75, at 64, 72, 80.
130. See supra note 79.
131. See supra note 73.
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avenues that can prevent or mitigate them. This section discusses
both judicial132 and non-judicial procedures.133
1. Judicial Involvement134
The first solution is pre-birth legal preparation, which is to
say, to initiate a pre-birth procedure so that the judicial order can
be granted as close as possible to the birth to file the form of VAP
prior to birth.135 This procedure can be invoked starting as early
as the moment of conception, or at a later point, which may be
relevant in situations where the intent is constructed during
pregnancy.136 This process does not confer that status during
pregnancy, nor does it provide authority over the fetus or the
pregnant party’s body.137 Far from doing so, it ensures that the
establishment of legal identification occurs at the same time as,
or as close as possible to, the child’s birth.138
This procedure has several advantages. It ensures clarity and
stability in the childcare relationship that will begin immediately
at birth and acknowledges the emotional involvement of both
parents. It may also be helpful in cases of dissolutions that occur
before the post-birth order is granted by foreclosing disputes
132. See infra Section II.C.1.
133. See infra Section II.C.2.
134. Another avenue for addressing the implications discussed above is to apply the
parental order so that it becomes effective retroactively from the moment the child is born.
The benefit of this avenue is that from the moment the order is applied, the parental status,
and all the benefits and responsibilities derived from that status, is vested on the anticipated
parent. See Naaman, Parental Order, supra note 80, at 281. That solution, however, is by
nature an ex-post facto remedy, and thus does not prevent the occurrence of temporal
discrepancy and its effects, among them the disruption of self-continuity (especially in cases
when the birth certificate is not revised to list the social parent’s name), the impediment of
financial safeguards, and the peculiar vulnerability of the family in the event of tragedy (e.g.,
dissolutions or the death of one of the parents) occurring before the judicial issuance.
135. See Katherine Farese, The Bun’s in the Oven, Now What?: How Pre-Birth Orders
Promote Clarity in Surrogacy Law, 23 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 25, 59 (2019).
136. Israeli law, for example, recently allows parties conceiving via sperm donation to
submit an application for a parental order sixty days prior to the birth. See FamA 9182/18
John Does v. The General Attorney, Nevo Legal Database (June 6, 2020) (Isr.). In other
jurisdictions, e.g., Florida and Minnesota, the anticipated parents can prepare the paperwork
ahead of time and even file the case before the birth, and the court will grant the actual order
after the birth. See Michelle Keeyes, ART in the Courts: Establishing Parentage of ART
Conceived Children (Part 2), 15 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 189, 192 (2016).
137. Purvis, Intended Parents, supra note 37, at 250.
138. Id. at 248.
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around the existence or validity of the former couple’s mutual
consent to conceive the child.139 Such a procedure can offer
protections for both the parents and the child. For example, prebirth procedures can offset efforts by a biological parent to deny
her former partner custodial or visitation rights despite their
mutual intent to have a child and their mutual responsibility for
the child’s future.140 Similarly, pre-birth procedures can foreclose
efforts by a social parent to disclaim responsibility for the child
and leave the child with the support of only the biological parent,
contrary to the former couple’s agreement.141 That process can
also be used as a proxy for consent to raise the child together.142
Finally, assigning future parental status to the anticipated parent
in cases of same-sex couples undergoing ART matches the legal
implications applied to sex-based reproduction, in which after the
conception the genetic parent cannot deny responsibilities in
relation to the child.143
The second solution is a pre-birth legal determination of the
parental status, i.e., pre-birth orders, that will be effective at
birth.144 Under this possibility, the parties sign a parenthood
agreement and, after reviewing it, a court issues an order
confirming the anticipated parents as the eventual child’s legal
parents.145 This model, in addition to the advantages of pre-birth
139. The reason for concern is that intent can be imprecise and difficult to express, and
even when there is a written agreement, there may still be disputes concerning the scope or
validity of the agreement. See id. at 249; Jessica Feinberg, Restructuring Rebuttal of the
Marital Presumption for the Modern Era, 104 MINN. L. REV. 243, 274-75 & nn.145-46
(2019) [hereinafter Feinberg, Restructuring Rebuttal].
140. See Purvis, Intended Parents, supra note 37, at 251.
141. See id.
142. See id. at 249.
143. See id. at 250.
144. In the United States, several jurisdictions have adopted this model. See, e.g., CAL.
FAM. CODE § 7962(f)(2) (West 2019); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/35(a) (2016); ME. STAT. tit.
19-a, § 1934(1)(B) (2016); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 126.720(4) (2017); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 168-B:12(I) (2015); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-67(a), (f)-(g) (2018); N.Y. FAM. LAW §
581-203(b), (d) (McKinney 2020); 15 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-8.1-804(a) (2020); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15C, § 804(a)(1) (2019); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26A.750(1)(a) (2018); D.C. CODE
§ 16-408(a), (e) (2017); see also UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 811(a) (NAT’L CONF. OF
COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE L. 2017). For further reading on this model—that is, the date
upon which the order becomes effective, see Joslin, (Not) Just Surrogacy, supra note 37, at
439-40.
145. Steven H. Snyder & Mary Patricia Byrn, The Use of Prebirth Parentage Orders
in Surrogacy Proceedings, 39 FAM. L.Q. 633, 633-34 & n.3 (2005).
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preparation discussed above, allows the parents to be listed on the
child’s birth certificate immediately after birth and resolves
insurance coverage affairs.146
A pre-birth order, however, raises tangible concerns in
surrogacy because that order may divest the surrogate of parental
rights to the eventual child before the birth.147 This outcome
raises a concern that the surrogate may not be able to truly consent
to relinquish her future parental status before birth.148 However,
this concern can be mitigated by simply subjecting the parental
determination to a waiting period, thereby balancing the certainty
of the anticipated parents and ensuring autonomy for the
surrogate.149 Moreover, a pre-birth order should not interfere
with the gestational party’s autonomy over her body during the
period of pregnancy.150 For example, if the anticipated parents
have second thoughts regarding the pregnancy, they could not
force the surrogate to have an abortion, nor would they have any
right to withdraw their status as parents.151 Conversely, if the
surrogate has second thoughts regarding the pregnancy and
decides to have an abortion, the anticipated parents would be
unable to prevent her from doing so.152 This method can also
benefit the surrogate as it assures her that the anticipated parents,
provided that they comply with the statutory requirements, will
take responsibility for the child after his birth.153
Another potential concern is that the fetus would be legally
understood as a person if parentage is assigned before the child’s
birth.154 However, if the order becomes effective only after the
146. Id. at 634-35; Farese, supra note 135, at 59.
147. Purvis, Intended Parents, supra note 37, at 235-37.
148. Conor Cory, Note, Access and Exploitation: Can Gay Men and Feminists Agree
on Surrogacy Policy?, 23 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 133, 136, 146-47 (2015).
149. See id. at 148-49. This could be applicable only if the order becomes effective
after the child’s birth. Note that currently there are jurisdictions, such as Illinois, in which
the order is effective immediately even if issued prior the child’s birth. See 750 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 47/35(a) (2016). The author does not advocate for establishing a status of parentage
before the child’s birth. See, in this regard, infra notes 201-04 and accompanying text.
150. See Joslin, (Not) Just Surrogacy, supra note 37, at 441.
151. Purvis, Intended Parents, supra note 37, at 250.
152. Id.
153. Sara L. Ainsworth, Bearing Children, Bearing Risks: Feminist Leadership for
Progressive Regulation of Compensated Surrogacy in the United States, 89 WASH. L. REV.
1077, 1120-21 (2014).
154. Joslin, (Not) Just Surrogacy, supra note 37, at 459.
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child’s birth, such a concern, to some extent, is alleviated, because
parentage has yet to be established.155 The problem is not with
the option for a pre-birth order per se, but with “what those orders
say and do[.]”156
Pre-birth procedures, either pre-birth preparation or
determination, while laudable, are still inadequate resolutions.
From a procedural aspect, court adjudications can easily become
an invasive and frustrating process involving multiple state actors
such as welfare agencies, state attorneys, and judges.157 These
procedures may also be subject to delays both on behalf of the
administrative agencies reviewing the application for the order
and the courts authorized to issue the order.158 In emergency
scenarios, such as those occurring in the era of COVID-19, this
concern becomes more tangible, as we may anticipate further
delays—either on behalf of the parties who cannot attend hearings
or on behalf of judges—impeding the issuance of the order.159
From a substantive aspect, individuals who are unaware of the
possibility of initiating the process before birth (or who do not
have sufficient resources for attaining this knowledge) may not
take advantage of this resolution.160 Hence, judicial procedure as
a condition for assigning parentage produces a gap between
disadvantaged and wealthy individuals, impeding substantial
equality between the formation of families on the grounds of
socio-economic status. This gap should encourage us to consider
more efficient and simpler methods for formalizing parentage
status, which do not involve court adjudication. The ensuing part
surveys such methods.

155. See id. at 38.
156. Id. at 442.
157. See Rebecca Aviel, A New Formalism for Family Law, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV.
2003, 2063-64 (2014).
158. See, e.g., Purvis, Intended Parents, supra note 37, at 244-45.
159. See Court Operations During COVID-19: 50-State Resources, JUSTIA,
[https://perma.cc/VYM5-FQSV] (last visited Nov. 23, 2021).
160. This concern is pronounced in cases of females conceiving via sperm donation
and less in surrogacy. In surrogacy, the anticipated parents are accompanied by an attorney.
Snyder & Byrn, supra note 145, at 633-34.
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2. Non-Judicial Involvement
One possibility for attributing parentage without judicial
intervention is based on pre-birth agreement which is taken into
effect at the child’s birth.161 In jurisdictions that have adopted
this model, such as Illinois,162 British Columbia,163 and
Ontario,164 if the statutory requirements—such as conducting a
written contract and using independent legal representation—are
fulfilled, the anticipated parents are registered as parents with the
relevant authorities immediately or soon after the birth.165 Under
such laws, judicial intervention is not required as a matter of
course but may be invoked in the event of a later dispute.166
Another possibility is a presumption of joint parenthood
based on couplehood. It has long been considered appropriate to
infer paternity from a couple’s relationship—as evidenced by
laws incorporating a marital presumption—laws that have
recently extended beyond the traditional heteronormative model
of marriage.167 Certain scholars, then, offer to move forward and
include couplehood as a basis for the presumption of joint
parenthood.168 This model frees the law from heteronormative
notions that are grounded exclusively in marriage,169 and
161. This possibility has been advocated by various scholars. See Joslin, Protecting
Children(?), supra note 124, at 1221; Melanie B. Jacobs, Parental Parity: Intentional
Parenthood’s Promise, 64 BUFF. L. REV. 465, 466-67 (2016). For further reading on the
advantages of establishing parenthood based on pre-birth agreement, see Yehezkel Margalit,
Intentional Parenthood: A Solution to the Plight of Same-Sex Partners Striving for Legal
Recognition as Parents, 12 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 39, 58-60 (2013).
162. 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 535/12 (2017); Surrogacy, ILL. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH,
[https://perma.cc/RK4E-USJH] (last visited Nov. 23, 2021).
163. Family Law Act, S.B.C. 2011, c. 25, § 29 (Can.).
164. All Families Are Equal Act, S.O. 2016, c. 23, § 10(3) (Can.).
165. See 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 535/12; All Families Are Equal Act, S.O. 2016, c. 23,
§§ 10–11 (Can.).
166. See 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 535/12(7); Family Law Act, S.B.C. 2011, c. 25, § 31(1)
(Can.); All Families Are Equal Act, S.O. 2016, c. 23, §§ 10(6), 11, 13 (Can.).
167. See supra notes 72-79 and accompanying text.
168. See Blecher-Prigat, Conceiving Parents, supra note 65, at 155. To date, this model
has been implemented in three Canadian provinces. See supra note 78.
169. Blecher-Prigat, Conceiving Parents, supra note 65, at 121. That presumption,
therefore, circumvents legal limitations related to law that might have unwanted side-effects
on the parentage regime. Take, for example, a jurisdiction like Israel that is dominated by
religious law, and that does not authorize same-sex marriage (but that registers such
marriages conducted in other jurisdictions by virtue of private international law). Ayelet
Blecher-Prigat & Noy Naaman, The Abolition of Legal Marriage in Israel as a Potential
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promotes stability and predictability at a low cost, as it does not
involve judicial discretion.170
While developing a particular implementation strategy is
beyond the scope of this Article, I conclude this section by
synthesizing three sets of questions that policymakers should
consider in relation to the suggested presumption. The first
relates to the meaning of the relationship on which the
presumption is grounded:
what factors will determine
171
couplehood?
Must the couple be sharing a household?172 If
so, for how long?173 Must the couple maintain a sexual
commitment?174 What moment in time will determine whether
the parties are in a relationship: the moment of birth or of
conception?175 The second concerns the rights of third parties.
How should the presumption be applied when there are multiple
potential parents?176 Who will receive priority among these
potential parents in jurisdictions that do not recognize more than
two parents?177 The third concerns scenarios involving a lack of
Queer-Religious Project, in QUEER AND RELIGIOUS ALLIANCES: FRIENDSHIP IN FAMILY
LAW AND BEYOND (Nausica Palazzo & Jeff Redding eds., forthcoming 2022) (manuscript
at 2-4).
170. See Aviel, supra note 157, at 2009 n.9.
171. See, e.g., infra note 173.
172. See, e.g., infra note 173.
173. In Ontario, e.g., the All Families Are Equal Act requires a conjugal relationship
without specifying a minimum duration. See All Families Are Equal Act, S.O. 2016, c. 23,
§§ 1, 8 (Can.) (defining spouse as “the person to whom a person is married or with whom
the person is living in a conjugal relationship outside marriage”). In Saskatchewan, by
contrast, the Children’s Law Act requires a conjugal relationship of at least two years before
the moment of conception. See Children’s Law Act, S.S. 2020, c. 2, §§ 55, 60, (defining
spouse as “legally married spouse of a person or a person with whom that person
has cohabited as spouses continuously for a period of not less than 2 years”).
174. One could assert that a commitment is not contingent on monogamy. See Edward
Stein, Adultery, Infidelity, and Consensual Non-Monogamy, 55 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 147,
168-69 (2020). This seems to be highly relevant in cases of gay men undergoing surrogacy,
as they disproportionately choose to maintain sexually non-exclusive relationships while still
committed to one another. See, e.g., Colleen H. Hoff & Sean C. Beougher, Sexual
Agreements Among Gay Male Couples, 39 ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAV. 774, 774 (2010).
175. For example, in Ontario, British Columbia, and Saskatchewan, the focus of the
presumption in cases of sperm donation is the moment of conception. See All Families Are
Equal Act, S.O. 2016, c. 23, § 8(3) (Can.); Family Law Act, S.B.C. 2011, c. 25, § 27(3)
(Can.); Children’s Law Act, S.S. 2020, c. 2, § 60 (Can.).
176. See Susan Frelich Appleton, Presuming Women: Revisiting the Presumption of
Legitimacy in the Same-Sex Couples Era, 86 B.U.L. REV. 227, 230-31 (2006).
177. In surrogacy, recognizing the parental status of the anticipated parents at birth
requires either ignoring the parental status of the surrogate or recognizing more than two

3 NAAMAN.MAN.FIN .DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022

4/13/22 10:04 AM

TIMING LEGAL PARENTHOOD

87

consent to raise the child. Can the couple decide in advance that
the presumption will not be applied?178
Under what
circumstances, if any, can one party change his mind?179
III. PRE-BIRTH TEMPORAL DISCREPANCY
The birth of a child legally signifies the birth of
parenthood.180 Self-identification as a parent, however, may
develop much earlier, as an ongoing process, producing an
indeterminate identity as a “parent-to-be” whose legal
implications are unclear.181 The tension between how an
individual perceives the process of becoming a parent and grows
into that identification, and how that process is viewed by the law,
was classified as the second form of temporal discrepancy.182
This part focuses on this doctrinal tension, examining whether
and how the law could moderate its implications.
A. The Contours of Temporal Discrepancy
Can the law acknowledge the process of becoming a parent?
I argue that it is eminently possible to recognize this fluid process
and that of the numerous considerations that might explain its
current failure to do so, several are misguided.
Legal scholars have long investigated how time
systematically infuses the law.183 Among them is Liaquat Ali
Khan, who offers the distinction between two elements, “points
in time” and “durations” of time.184 Khan builds on these
parents (assuming that the law grants parental status to women based on the act of giving
birth). One way to approach this tension is to craft a rule requiring a post-birth waiting period
before that presumption becomes effective. Cf. NeJaime, Nature, supra note 73, at 2340;
Feinberg, Restructuring Rebuttal, supra note 139, at 244 n.8.
178. See All Families Are Equal Act, S.O. 2016, c. 23, § 8(3) (Can.); Family Law Act,
S.B.C. 2011, c. 25, § 27(3) (Can.); Children’s Law Act, S.S. 2020, c. 2, § 60(3) (Can.).
179. One can readily envision scenarios in which the presumption should not apply
due to lack of mutual consent to raise the child together. See All Families Are Equal Act,
S.O. 2016, c. 23, § 8(3) (Can.); Family Law Act, S.B.C. 2011, c. 25, § 27(3) (Can.);
Children’s Law Act, S.S. 2020, c. 2, § 60(3) (Can.).
180. Blecher-Prigat, Conceiving Parents, supra note 65, at 120.
181. See id. at 151; see also discussion supra Section II.B.1.
182. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
184. Khan, supra note 33, at 63.
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elements to develop two other principles that are relevant to my
analysis.185 The first, “time trigger[,]” elaborates on the first
element, a point in time, and refers to the moment that activates
or ends rights and obligations.186 The second principle features
the second element, duration of time, and shows that this element
can be either definite or indefinite.187
I argue that the distinction between these principles can
explain the occurrence of temporal discrepancy. While the
construction of the legal identification as a parent is captured by
the principle of time-trigger, the construction of self-identification
may occur over a duration of time. Specifically, the time-trigger
of the legal identification is the moment a child is born, as that is
the moment at which the legal responsibilities and entitlements
inherent in the parental status initiate.188 Self-identification, by
contrast, like other human dynamics, is not always confined to a
specific point in time but develops organically and gradually. The
temporality of the human dynamic can be expressed as a duration
of time that can be either definite or indefinite.189 The
construction of self-identification is definite when that process
has a starting point and an ending point.190 For example, it may
begin at the moment of the decision to conceive and end at the
moment of the birth.191 Together, both points describe a definite
timeframe. But the duration of the development of selfidentification can also be indefinite; this is when selfidentification commences somewhere after or prior to the moment
of conception and emerges gradually, along a spectrum.192 That
185. Id. at 58.
186. Id. at 87.
187. Id. at 65-68 (noting that a provision that ceases to exist at a specified date is an
example of a legal principle characterized by a definite duration of time, and the concept of
“reasonable time” is an example of a legal principle characterized by an indefinite duration
of time).
188. See Pamela Laufer-Ukeles & Ayelet Blecher-Prigat, Between Function and
Form: Towards a Differentiated Model of Functional Parenthood, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV.
419, 421, 435-36, 463 (2013).
189. See Khan, supra note 33, at 65-69.
190. See id. at 65.
191. See id.
192. See id. at 67. Compare this with the critique of the requirement for pre-conception
intention as a condition for parental determination. That intention, as Ayelet Blecher-Prigat
highlights, “does not emerge as a momentary event, but rather is a process that evolves and
develops over time.” See Blecher-Prigat, Conceiving Parents, supra note 65, at 151; see
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spectrum, however, remains ignored from a legal perspective.193
The disparity between the development of the legal identification,
on the one hand, and the construction of self-identification, on the
other, constitutes the second form of temporal discrepancy.194
Indeed, the doctrinal analysis of temporality provides a
plausible explanation for the occurrence of temporal
discrepancy;195 however, I believe that this explanation wrongly
describes temporal discrepancy as an inevitable phenomenon. To
better understand that temporal tension, I offer to shift the gaze
toward the political considerations that shape its occurrence.
As a new infant depends on others for his survival, there is a
clear public interest in assigning responsibility for the infant to an
adult who can take care of his needs immediately upon his
birth.196 Would this interest not be better served if the anticipated
parents were legally recognized as such before the birth? Why,
then, do so many legal regimes use birth as the triggering event
for creating the legal status of parenthood?197 I outline two
explanations below, each grounded in political-cultural
considerations.
The first explanation reflects an interest in protecting the
self-determination of the party who carries the fetus.198 This
consideration can be divided into two interrelated concerns. The
first is that recognizing the legal status of the parent-to-be might
equate prenatal life with actual life.199 Once the law formalizes
the legal status of the anticipated parent as such, the argument

also Carlos A. Ball, Rendering Children Illegitimate in Former Partner Parenting Cases:
Hiding Behind the Façade of Certainty, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 623, 661
(2012) (stating that “[w]hether that intent existed, and whether it was demonstrated through
particular understandings and conduct, would seem to be more important than its precise
timing (i.e., whether it was manifested before or after conception).”). My analysis extends
beyond that critique and encompasses other relational elements underlying the process of
becoming a parent that slip under the radar of the law. See infra notes 220-24 and
accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 188-94 and accompanying text.
196. Laufer-Ukeles & Blecher-Prigat, supra note 188, at 463-64.
197. Id. at 421, 435-36, 463.
198. Joslin, (Not) Just Surrogacy, supra note 37, at 457, 459; see supra notes 150-52
and accompanying text.
199. Joslin, (Not) Just Surrogacy, supra note 37, at 408.
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goes, it equally accords legal status to the fetus as a child-to-be.200
Granting legal existence to the fetus, however, plays into antiabortion rhetoric at odds with women’s right to selfdetermination.201 For that reason, it comes as no surprise that prochoice advocates focus on the moment of birth as the outset of a
woman’s relational status to the fetus.202 The second concern
involves the relationship between the gestational party and the
anticipated parents, which becomes apparent in the context of
surrogacy and pre-birth orders.203 This line of concern focuses on
the possibility that recognizing a legal status of “parent-to-be”
might be construed as granting such parties abortion-related rights
that would limit the self-determination of pregnant women.204
However, recognizing the period at which a parent is
anticipating parenthood is not the same as recognizing parental
status, nor does it endow this status with the same rights to which
a parent is entitled.205 As I will illustrate in the next section, the
implications of becoming a parent are separate from questions
regarding when a fetus is deemed to become a person and do not
inherently grant legal rights to the fetus.206 Understanding that
the process of becoming a parent can be legally recognized
without acknowledging the personhood of the fetus and without
infringing on the gestational party’s self-determination
diminishes these concerns.207
200. Id. at 408, 441-42.
201. This concern has been evident within the debate around the Missing Angel Act in
the United States, which authorizes grieving parents to request from the state a birth
certificate for a stillborn child. With this in mind, Carol Sanger posits that the stakes of
recognizing that emotional suffering of the grieving parents, the (lost) to-be-parents, “may
take on a life of its own” by granting benefits to the grieving parent in the year of the birth.
Carol Sanger, “The Birth of Death”: Stillborn Birth Certificates and the Problem for Law,
100 CAL. L. REV. 269, 306-08 (2012). Doing so, Sanger cautions, equates prenatal life with
life of a born baby, playing into the trap of those who advocate for criminalizing abortions.
Id. This concern has been raised in relation to pre-birth orders that establish the parental
status of the intended parents in surrogacy prior to the birth. See Joslin, (Not) Just Surrogacy,
supra note 37, at 441.
202. Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, The Disembodied Womb: Pregnancy, Informed Consent,
and Surrogate Motherhood, 43 N.C. J. INT’L L. 96, 102 (2018).
203. Cory, supra note 148, at 144-45.
204. Jennifer S. Hendricks, Fathers and Feminism: The Case Against Genetic
Entitlement, 91 TUL. L. REV. 473, 522-24 (2017).
205. See infra Sections III.B.1, III.B.2.
206. See infra Section III.B.
207. Cory, supra note 148, at 144-45.
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A second explanation for why the creation of the legal status
of parenthood is tethered to the moment of the child’s birth is
grounded in cultural beliefs surrounding childbearing.208
According to the Jewish tradition, for instance, taking certain
actions before a birth, including having baby showers, revealing
a baby’s intended name, and buying clothes or preparing a room
for the baby, should be postponed until the birth to avoid “bad
luck.”209 This belief reflects the broader idea rooted in the Jewish
tradition that celebrating something we anticipate before it
happens might cause the “evil eye” (ayin hara).210 This line of
thought runs through the regulation of parental orders in Israel,
specifically in the Attorney General’s approach when opposing
petitions to provide pre-birth orders,211 and in a recent report
issued by a government-appointed task force that assesses the
circumstances under which a parental order can be issued.212
However, ignoring the process of becoming a parent in the
name of such cultural beliefs is problematic in the context of
today’s technologically sophisticated environment.213 As I
explain below, the law can recognize that an individual is
anticipating parenthood without taking any direct action
concerning the eventual child or granting legal rights to the fetus
as a separate entity.
B. Bridging the Gap
How, and for what purpose, can the law recognize the
process of becoming a parent? To pursue this inquiry, I focus on
208. See, e.g., Yael Hashiloni-Dolev, The Effect of Jewish-Israeli Family Ideology on
Policy Regarding Reproductive Technologies, in BIOETHICS AND BIOPOLITICS IN ISRAEL:
SOCIO-LEGAL, POLITICAL, AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS (Hagai Boas, et., eds., 2018).
209. See Jennifer Saranow Schultz, Miscarriage, Superstition and the Jewish Baby
Shower, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2014, 11:01 AM), [https://perma.cc/W545-2QBY] (last
visited Nov. 24, 2021). The Jewish belief is in contrast with the Christian notion of
conferring early status as a person. Hashiloni-Dolev, supra note 208, at 124-25.
210. Rabbi Philip Sherman, Why Don’t Many Jewish Couples Have Baby Showers or
Buy Things for Their Baby Ahead of Time? JEWISHBOSTON (Aug. 20, 2013),
[https://perma.cc/H3KN-LJY3] (last visited Nov. 24, 2021).
211. That opposition was represented in their response to the appeal submitted to the
Supreme Court in FamA 9182/18 John Does v. The General Attorney (June 6, 2020), Nevo
Legal Database (Isr.).
212. INTER-MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE GUIDELINES, supra note 80, at 30-31.
213. Sherman, supra note 210.
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two terrains in which temporal discrepancy occurring before birth
emerges; in each, I identify various ways in which questions of
parentage arise prior to the moment of the birth, assess how the
failure to recognize the process of becoming a parent inflicts harm
on that person, and consider how an inclusive vision of becoming
a parent might look. Far from offering a full prescription, I hope
that my analysis can be used as a stepping stone for thinking more
seriously about the law in a way that promotes accountability for
such harms.
Let’s begin with the two elements of the suggested vision.
The first concerns the timeframe of becoming a parent. The
process of becoming a parent is oriented by several events
transpiring during the process of conceiving and carrying a child
to term; the birth is only one constitutive, though crucial, event in
that process.214 Such understanding may become more apparent
in cases of ART, where the trajectory to parenthood could take
years, especially if that process involves experience of
conception-related difficulties and can be challenging and timeconsuming.215 The way individuals perceive themselves as
becoming parents, therefore, may not be forged abruptly at their
child’s birth, but may instead develop gradually and become
complete at the birth.216 That is, the birth completes, rather than
establishes, this process.217 Accordingly, I propose that this
period of time should be considered in disputes relating to
parenthood.218
214. See supra Section III.A.
215. Gash & Raiskin, supra note 102, at 97, 99.
216. See Blecher-Prigat, Conceiving Parents, supra note 65, at 151; see also supra
Section III.A.
217. See supra Section III.A.
218. One question, which will accompany us throughout the ensued discussion and
should be considered further, is when exactly this process initiates. There are several
possibilities—the moment of a mutual consent to conceive, the moment of initial conception
(sperm meets egg), the moment of fertilization (an embryo forms), the moment of
implantation (the embryo successfully implants in the wall of the uterus), or somewhere after
that point during pregnancy. It seems that the significance of determining the moment at
which this process initiates varies in accordance with specific legal aspects. For assisted
reproduction purposes, questions such as the following arise: if one consented to the assisted
reproduction after the pregnancy occurred, might one be able to change one’s mind? And,
if this happens, does the withdrawal depend on the approval of the other party? Also, what
if one consents, but then later seeks to withdraw consent and does so prior to transfer and
conception? Is it then possible that one might still be held to be a parent of the resulting
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The second element concerns the content of that timeframe.
The process of becoming a parent is not confined to events with
biological elements, such as sexual intercourse, conception, or the
delivery of the child.219 The process also encompasses relational
elements, such as the mutual decision to conceive and raise a
child, multiple forms of work associated with the process of
becoming a parent—like adopting behavioral patterns needed to
prepare for the parental role and developing a social network to
facilitate the adjustment to the new role of a parent220—and
special arrangements involved in ART procedure,221 such as
aspects of the decision-making processes, e.g., whom of the two
women would carry and bear the child,222 or whom of the two
men would supply the sperm to impregnate the egg donor,223
researching medical options and legal constraints, finding a clinic
for the reproductive procedure, meeting an egg or sperm donor,
meeting physicians or surrogacy agency staff for in-vitro
fertilization, selecting a surrogacy agency, choosing a prospective
surrogate and establishing meaningful relationship with her,224
and undertaking legal actions involved in that process, such as
negotiating the agreements involved.225 All such elements, in the
eyes of the anticipated parent, contribute to the child’s birth and
shape his selfhood as a parent, which he experiences as an
ongoing process rather than as something fixed or static.226
child? In the United States, for example, the 2017 UPA allows the intended party in
surrogacy to change its mind before an embryo transfer. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 808(a)
(NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE L. 2017); see also Dara E. Purvis, Expectant
Fathers, Abortion, and Embryos, 43 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 330, 330, 335 (2015).
219. David Fontana & Naomi Schoenbaum, Unsexing Pregnancy, 119 COLUM. L.
REV. 309, 325-30 (2019).
220. Id. at 327-30.
221. Gash & Raiskin, supra note 102, at 104; Darren Rosenblum et al., Pregnant
Man?: A Conversation, 22 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 207, 208-17 (2010).
222. For the complexity of this aspect, see Abbie E. Goldberg, The Transition to
Parenthood for Lesbian Couples, 2 J. GLBT FAM. STUD. 13, 24-25 (2006).
223. Dana Berkowitz, Gay Men and Surrogacy, in LGBT-PARENT FAMILIES:
INNOVATIONS IN RESEARCH & IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE 76 (Abbie E. Goldberg &
Katherine R. Allen eds., 2013).
224. Elly Teman & Zsuzsa Berend, Surrogate Non-Motherhood: Israeli and US
Surrogates Speak about Kinship and Parenthood, 25 ANTHROPOLOGY & MED. 296, 300,
308 (2018).
225. Id. at 299.
226. Compare with the literature of legal embodiment. See, e.g., Ruth Fletcher et al.,
Legal Embodiment: Analysing the Body of Healthcare Law 16 MED. L. REV. 321, 335-44
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Accordingly, one may view both the biological and relational
elements as constituting the parental status.227
That
understanding, in turn, produces a need to consider how the law
could be more responsive to the experience of becoming a parent.
I should clarify that I do not suggest that the anticipated
parent should be legally recognized as a parent before the child’s
birth or that anticipated parents should have parental rights before
the birth. Instead, I propose that the law should acknowledge the
process of becoming both through the body and the self and
should reflect both the physical implications of that process and
its relational elements, though without neglecting the gestationalrelated concerns discussed above. In the following sections, I
examine two terrains that exemplify pre-birth temporal
discrepancy and consider how the implementation of my vision
might look.
1. Work-Family Conflicts
In various jurisdictions, the law provides employment
entitlements based on parental status, such as paternity leave and
protections against discrimination based on parental status,
regardless of who carried the fetus or has a genetic relationship to
the child.228 When it comes to the period of pregnancy, however,
the law generally provides special rights only to the pregnant
woman.229 This is out of the recognition that pregnancy, a
condition unique to women, entails peculiar physical and social
implications.230 Pregnant women, for example, are more likely to
face employment discrimination based on the assumption that
(2008) (stressing the subjective, intersubjective, material, and symbolic dimensions of
embodiment, and how these dimensions do, and should, inform the law).
227. Some scholars argue that the embodiments of becoming a parent extend beyond
identity-constituting and involve also relationship-constituting. Alison Reiheld, “The Event
That Was Nothing”: Miscarriage as a Liminal Event, 46 J. SOC. PHIL. 9, 11 (2015).
228. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.120 (2018).
229. When the law does provide the anticipated father with benefits relating to
pregnancy, though, it is mostly when it is necessary for him to care for his pregnant partner.
See, e.g., the Family and Medical Leave Act in the United States which provides beneﬁts
relating to pregnancy to an anticipated father only when necessary “to care for a pregnant
spouse . . . .” See 29 C.F.R. § 825.120(a)(5) (2018).
230. Joanna L. Grossman, Expanding the Core: Pregnancy Discrimination Law as It
Approaches Full Term, 52 IDAHO L. REV. 825, 848-49 (2016).
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they will soon be missing work due to their caregiving
responsibilities.231
The process of becoming a parent, nonetheless, involves
human investments that do not flow directly from its gestational
elements, such as attending prenatal appointments and learning
how to care for an infant.232 Additionally, the process may
provoke physiological or psychological effects unrelated to
carrying the fetus, such as antenatal depression among anticipated
fathers due to worries about being a parent.233 These investments
and implications are overlooked by the law, however,
exemplifying what I theorize as one type of temporal
discrepancy.234
The implications of this oversight are palpable in two
categories of employment conflicts, both of which are peculiar to
couples in which neither party is pregnant, e.g., couples (same- or
different-sex), or single individuals who have children through
surrogacy. The first category involves adverse employment
actions based on the parent-to-be status.235 In a scenario in which
an employer’s decision not to hire a (non-pregnant) prospective
employee or not to promote a current (non-pregnant) employee
based on that employee’s status as an anticipated parent, the
employee may find himself without a cause of action under antidiscrimination laws.236 For example, when a single man is
anticipating becoming a parent by surrogacy, the employer might
assume that he is not a dependable employee because of potential
future obligations reducing his investment in work, especially
after the birth.237 Because, in the classic scenario, this assumption
231. Shelley J. Correll et al., Getting a Job: Is There a Motherhood Penalty, 112 AM.
J. SOCIO. 1297, 1297 (2007); Caroline Gatrell, Managing the Maternal Body: A
Comprehensive Review and Transdisciplinary Analysis, 13 INT’L J. MGMT. REVS. 97, 98100 (2011).
232. Fontana & Schoenbaum, supra note 219, at 327-30.
233. Id. at 337.
234. See supra Section III.A.
235. See infra text accompanying notes 253-54.
236. See infra text accompanying notes 253-54.
237. There is a presumption that employers prefer anticipated fathers as compared to
men who do not expect children out of the assumption that anticipated fathers increase their
breadwinning efforts. See Fontana & Shoenbaum, supra note 219, at 348 & n.241 (citing
Shelly Lundberg & Elaina Rose, Parenthood and the Earnings of Married Men and Women,
7 LAB. ECON. 689, 705-06 (2000)). However, that may not be true in cases of a gay couple
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typically disadvantages pregnant women, anti-discrimination
statutes contemplate recourse for adverse actions taken against
pregnant employees.238 Single men, gay couples, and other nongestational parents, however, may be considered outside the
scope of such statutes’ protections.239
The second category involves adverse employment actions
based on the conduct of the anticipated parent, such as
disciplining an employee for being absent from work to attend a
prenatal appointment or ultrasound test of the surrogate or any
other pre-birth caregiving responsibilities.240 Such actions may
not give rise to an actionable claim of discrimination, since the
law generally does not consider non-gestational anticipated
parents to be within the scope of individuals entitled to invoke
statutory protections.241 By contrast, an anticipated gestational
mother may have a cause of action in the same scenario.242 Giving
legal rights only to the prebirth care-work of a pregnant person is
normatively problematic, especially once we realize that people
undergoing ART have particular prebirth arrangements that may
require their absence from work.243
These two categories of conflicts illustrate that during the
period of pregnancy—or even earlier, while conducting fertility
treatments—certain employees may be subject to adverse
employment actions based on their status or efforts as parents-tobe, but lack legal remedies to redress them.244 Scholars argue that
conceiving through surrogacy given the assumption that the employee will be more likely to
be absent to fulfill his parental responsibilities.
238. Courts in the United States have held that Title VII and the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act (“PDA”) “prohibit[] an employer from discriminating against a woman
‘because of her capacity to become pregnant.’” See, e.g., Kocak v. Cmty. Health Partners,
400 F.3d 466, 469 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric.
Implement Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 206 (1991)).
239. See Fontana & Shoenbaum, supra note 219, at 338.
240. For a discussion of the antagonism directed toward male caregiving embedded in
the workplace, see Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Men at Work, Fathers at Home:
Uncovering the Masculine Face of Caregiver Discrimination, 24 COLUM. J. GENDER & L.
253, 257, 265-69 (2013).
241. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
242. For example, the United States PDA, which amended Title VII to protect against
pregnancy discrimination, covers only women. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
243. See In Vitro Fertilization (IVF), MAYO CLINIC (Sept. 10, 2021),
[https://perma.cc/8934-X52G] (last visited Nov. 24, 2021).
244. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).

3 NAAMAN.MAN.FIN .DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022

TIMING LEGAL PARENTHOOD

4/13/22 10:04 AM

97

this vulnerability lies in the fact that pregnancy is sexualized—
i.e., that issues arising during pregnancy are framed as issues
pertaining exclusively to women—and, therefore, the
implications of pregnancy that are independent of the pregnant
body are invisible to the law.245 Following this line of thought, I
suggest thinking about these conflicts through the lens of
becoming a parent. That is, rather than focusing on pregnancy per
se, we should consider how the period of gestation incorporates
both biological and relational elements.246 By disentangling the
implications of becoming a parent from those that relate to the
physician condition of pregnancy, I do not aim to trivialize the
risks of pregnancy for the gestational party, nor to obscure how
pregnancy has been used to justify the oppression of women.
Rather to clear space for thinking how the law could be responsive
to the nuanced needs of all anticipated parents, including those of
the non-gestational anticipated parents.
Two ways emerge for implementing such a vision in
practice. The first, as David Fontana and Naomi Schoenbaum
offer, is to provide to non-gestational anticipated parents the same
entitlements that pregnant women receive when the entitlements
are designed to address non-biological prebirth care and
commitments.247 These may include, for example, the right to be
absent from work to attend prenatal obstetrician appointments.248
While employers cannot ask for evidence of the appointment,
employers may ask for a declaration of the time and date of the
appointment and of the employee’s relationship with the person
undergoing treatment.249 This avenue would ensure that the nongestational parents could engage in pre-birth work without the
risk of adverse employment consequences.250 It would also
245. Fontana & Schoenbaum, supra note 219, 311-13.
246. See supra text accompanying notes 217-27.
247. See supra text accompanying notes 217-27; Fontana & Schoenbaum, supra note
219, at 324, 336, 338, 354.
248. For example, the UK created a sex-neutral paid prenatal leave program allowing
the non-gestational party to be absent from work to attend a number of prenatal
appointments. See Department for Business, Innovation & Skills & Jo Swinson, Press
Release: New Right for Fathers and Partners to Attend Antenatal Appointments, GOV.UK
(Oct. 2, 2014), [https://perma.cc/8ZCP-DKVQ] (last visited Nov. 24, 2021).
249. Id.
250. See Fontana & Schoenbaum, supra note 219, at 339-40, 366.
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encourage early development of the emotional bond between
parent and child, which may be weaker when the anticipated
parent does not carry the fetus, by facilitating the involvement of
the anticipated parents in the process of becoming a parent.251
Finally, fostering the non-gestational party’s involvement can
strengthen the relationship between parents so that they can
effectively co-parent the child.252
Another avenue to further consider is providing protection
against employment discrimination based on the employee’s
status of parent-to-be. Just as employment laws prohibit
discrimination against an employee based on parental status after
the child’s birth (regardless of the employee’s gestational or
genetic tie to the child), the law could extend those protections to
the pre-birth period.253 Specifically, the law could recognize
“anticipated parents” as a protected class under current regimes
or enact separate restrictions to prevent employers from
terminating employees based on their status of becoming parents.
These protections could be triggered, for example, by the
employee’s initiation of fertility treatments, at the moment the
employee shares his intention to do so with the employer, or when
the employee informs the employer about the pregnancy of their
future child—namely, when the employee becomes vulnerable to
biases concerning his future commitment to the workplace. This
avenue, however, requires careful consideration of who falls
within the class of anticipated parents,254 and necessitates a
determination of how it could operate in such a manner which
does not unduly burden employers.

251. Id. at 345.
252. This outcome is vital for marriage-like relationships that lack the institutional
support for the commitment that marriage enjoys. See Elizabeth S. Scott, A World Without
Marriage, 41 FAM. L.Q. 537, 562-64 (2007).
253. The Human Rights Code, RSO 1990, c H-19, s 5 (provincial statute prohibiting
employment discrimination in Ontario) is an illustrative scheme that could implement these
avenue. This statute provides protections against discrimination on the ground of family
status. It might be worth observing that nothing necessarily prevents a tribunal from
interpreting this protected ground under the Ontario Human Rights Code in a way that
extends protection back in time to cover the context of pregnancy. I am indebted to Kerry
Rittich for this observation.
254. One way could be those who are or who might be determined to be parents at the
moment of the child’s birth.
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2. Reproductive Malpractice
Reproductive malpractice resulting in pregnancy loss
provides another manifestation of temporal discrepancy. As these
disputes arise at the moment tortious conduct suddenly disrupts
the process of becoming a parent, they exemplify the relationship
between the “to-be” self—specifically its liminal character255—
and the law’s (ex-post) acknowledgment of that status or liminal
event.256 This section examines how a broader vision of
becoming a parent can be implemented to address such disputes.
To pursue my inquiry, I consider compensation-based schemes
for intangible harms, under the laws of the United States and
Israel, though my analysis could be applicable to other
jurisdictions as well, given that the inquiry under consideration
transcends jurisdictional boundaries.257
Jurisdictions in the United States vary in terms of the scope
of the right to recovery they recognize for intangible harms
arising out of tortious pregnancy loss.258 Most jurisdictions
provide legal recourse for such harms only if the plaintiff suffers
a physical injury.259 Accordingly, non-gestational parties
typically have no legal claim for malpractice resulting in a
miscarriage or stillbirth.260 Courts in the United States that have
permitted legal recovery for a non-gestational parent have limited
255. Reiheld, supra note 227, at 9-12.
256. Id. at 17.
257. I do not purport to offer a doctrinal analysis. For a comprehensive overview of
the statutes and judicial cases in the United States, see, e.g., Jill Wieber Lens, Tort Law’s
Devaluation of Stillbirth, 19 NEV. L.J. 955, 987-92 (2019).
258. It was only in 2004, for example, in the case of Broadnax v. Gonzalez, that the
New York Court of Appeals permitted the gestational plaintiff, the grieving anticipated
mother, to recover for emotional anguish resulting from miscarriage (or stillbirth) caused by
medical malpractice even though she did not suffer any physical injuries. See, 809 N.E.2d
645, 648-49 (N.Y. 2004). The court clarified that this recourse is not applicable to the father,
and commentators have argued that this view is grounded “on the inseparable and completely
intertwined relationship between the mother and the fetus.” Alicia A. Ellis, Note, Better Late
Than Never: New York Finally Closes the “Gap” in Recovery Permitted for Negligent
Infliction of Emotional Distress in Prenatal Medical Malpractice Cases, 80 ST. JOHN’S L.
REV. 725, 750 (2006).
259. For a critique of this legal principle, see generally DOV FOX, BIRTH RIGHTS AND
WRONGS: HOW MEDICINE AND TECHNOLOGY ARE REMAKING REPRODUCTION AND THE
LAW (2019).
260. Jill Lens shows that only a few courts have recognized a claim by the father. See
Lens, supra note 257, at 987.
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liability to circumstances in which that parent witnessed the
conduct causing the physical injury or the plaintiff’s own physical
safety was at risk.261 The reluctance to compensate a nongestational party for other intangible harms incident to pregnancy
loss reinforces the notion that becoming a parent is essentially a
gestational process.
This reductionist understanding of parenthood-to-be is
normatively problematic.
Research has shown that both
gestational and non-gestational parents experience emotional
suffering in the event of pregnancy loss due to psychological
factors involved in pregnancy.262 The psychologist Anna
Brandon, for example, demonstrated that developing a prenatal
attachment during pregnancy can transpire regardless of the
anticipated parent’s sex.263 The research of Nathaniel Wagner on
anticipated parents who lost their fetus showed that “men suffer
loss in much the same way as women and that culture is the
primary factor leading to the demonstrated difference in response
. . . .”264 Likewise, an Irish study that examined the emotional
impact of miscarriage on men found that men are inclined to hide
their emotions so that they would be perceived as strong for their
partners.265 Overall, this research demonstrates that there is a
need to approach this experience from a perspective that
denaturalizes the link between the psychological and gestational
experiences of becoming a parent.
One could envision intangible injuries in this context as
those involving the disruption of the self-authorship,266 the loss of
261. Id. at 988.
262. See, e.g., Nathaniel J. Wagner et al., Fathers’ Lived Experiences of Miscarriage,
26 FAM. J.: COUNSELING & THERAPY FOR COUPLES & FAMS. 193, 193, 195-96, 198 (2018);
Anna R. Brandon et al., A History of the Theory of Prenatal Attachment, J. PRENATAL &
PERINATAL PSYCH. & HEALTH 201, 213 (2009).
263. Brandon et al., supra note 262, at 210-11.
264. Nathaniel J. Wagner et al., supra note 262, at 193.
265. McDonald, Men’s Feelings Ignored Over Miscarriages, SUNDAY TIMES (Aug.
15, 2004, 1:00 AM), [https://perma.cc/5RQX-V9K5] (last visited Nov. 25, 2021).
266. Such an argument can be supported by studies highlighting how the prenatal
period becomes a driving force that leads to the development of the paternal identity. See
Catarina Silva et al., Transition to Fatherhood in the Prenatal Period: A Qualitative Study,
26 CIÊNCIA & SAÚDE COLETIVA 465, 466-70 (2021); Hongjian Cao et al., Identity
Transformation During the Transition to Parenthood Among Same-Sex Couples: An
Ecological, Stress-Strategy-Adaptation Perspective, 8 J. FAM. THEORY & REV. 30, 30
(2016). In this regard, Dov Fox offers to think about the intangible harm caused to the
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possibility,267 the expectations for becoming a parent,268 or the
linear process of “relationship-constituting[,]”269 all of which
resonate with the notion of being invested in “physical . . . human
. . . and social capital . . . .”270 This investment includes various
elements, such as accumulating goods needed to care for the
eventual child, forming social networks necessary for the
pregnancy or the eventual child, or other activities involved in
developing the identity of a future parent.271 Focusing on these
elements—all of which are shared by the gestational and the nongestational anticipated parents—highlights the shortcomings of
regimes that limit the scope of non-gestational parties’ recourse
for intangible losses.272
That limitation, furthermore, raises a paradox in surrogacy.
Though the surrogate is likely to be compensated for her
emotional distress, the actual anticipated parents’ distress over
the loss of the eventual child may remain uncompensated.273
Certainly, pregnancy loss entails a penetrating emotional loss.274
This has been shown to be true even for surrogates who disclaim
any attachment to the fetus, and regardless of the level of fetal
development or whether the surrogate suffers a physical injury.275
Yet the anticipated parents are at least as susceptible as the
anticipated parent in similar events of reproductive malpractice, e.g., the loss of frozen
embryos caused by the fertility clinic, as “[t]he disruption of family planning” because the
tortfeasor’s actions invade “the control individuals have over their reproductive lives[,]” and
cause the loss of “people’s legitimate expectations to exercise a reasonable measure of
control over decisions about having children.” See Dov Fox, Reproductive Negligence, 117
COLUM. L. REV. 149, 159, 172, 210-11 (2017).
267. Julia Frost et al., The Loss of Possibility: Scientisation of Death and the Special
Case of Early Miscarriage, 29 SOCIO. HEALTH & ILLNESS 1003, 1013 (2007).
268. See Erica Richards, Note, Loss of Potential Parenthood as a Statutory Solution to
the Conflict Between Wrongful Death Remedies and Roe v. Wade, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
809, 812-13 (2006).
269. See Reiheld, supra note 227,at 11.
270. Fontana & Schoenbaum, supra note 219, at 327.
271. Id. at 327-30.
272. See id. at 327-28, 330.
273. Lens, supra note 257, at 976 n.154.
274. Zsuzsa Berend, Surrogate Losses: Understandings of Pregnancy Loss and
Assisted Reproduction Among Surrogate Mothers, 24 MED. ANTHROPOLOGY Q. 240, 242
(2010).
275. See id. at 242-44, 253 (framing the surrogate’s harm as a failure to deliver the
promised “gift of life” and a loss of both “the . . . ‘journey’ and the dream of fully belonging
to the surrogate community” and “the [anticipated parents’] trust and appreciation”).
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surrogate to mental anguish in the event of pregnancy loss, though
they may experience their grief differently.276
Tort law is one means by which private parties pursue
reparation for their injuries.277 Grounding legal recovery for
intangible harms associated with tortious pregnancy loss
exclusively on the gestational bond is at odds with modern family
structures and technological innovations that disentangle biology
from the responsibility of raising a child.278 Moreover, its
gestational focus produces a systematic distinction between
couples who conceive with the assistance of a surrogate and other
couples.279 These observations underscore the need for tort law
to evolve to reflect modern realities, compensate all anticipated
parents who suffer emotional injuries as a result of tortious
conduct, and redress systematic inequalities.
Critics of this view will undoubtedly argue that once we
begin to consider according non-gestational parties legal rights
and remedies in relation to pregnancy loss, we open the door to
claims by such parties that would restrict women’s reproductive
right to abortion.280 Certainly, that is a tangible concern.
Nevertheless, there are at least two reasons to believe that
abortion rights and my vision could coexist.281 First, while my
suggested view contemplates compensation for tortious conduct
resulting in the loss of pregnancy, “[a]bortion is a voluntary
termination of pregnancy.”282 Second, my suggested view does
not create any rights for the unborn child, but instead, it aims to
provide recovery to the grieving individuals for their emotional
pain stemming from the loss of pregnancy and of the relationship
with their desired (unborn) child.

276. See generally Christa Craven and Elizabeth Peel, Stories of Grief and Hope:
Queer Experiences of Reproductive Loss, in QUEERING MOTHERHOOD: NARRATIVE AND
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES (Margaret F. Gibson, ed., 2014).
277. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 (AM. L. INST. 1979).
278. See Lens, supra note 257, at 987.
279. See id. at 976 n.154.
280. See Sanger, supra note 201, at 305; Rita M. Dunaway, The Personhood Strategy:
A State’s Prerogative to Take Back Abortion Law, 47 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 327, 327 (2011).
281. Cf. Lens, supra note 257, at 1009-12 (positing that a tort recognition of stillbirth
is consistent with abortion rights).
282. Id. at 1006.
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The Israeli regulatory regime illustrates how challenges to
gestation-based distinctions can channel a more inclusive vision
of becoming a parent. The Israeli Supreme Court in Levy v.
Shaare Zedek Medical Center (“Levi”) paved the way for a
regulatory scheme that allows anticipated non-gestational parents
to recover for intangible harms associated with tortious
pregnancy-related injuries.283 Levi involved a prenatal injury
when a fetus “died” in utero as a result of the hospital’s
negligence.284 The court ruled that both the anticipated mother
and the anticipated father could be compensated for their
emotional harm.285 All three judges held that the anticipated
mother was a direct victim due to her role in the act of giving
birth, during which the damage was caused.286 But the judges
were split as to whether the anticipated father, who was exposed
to the anticipated mother’s injury, should be classified as a direct
victim or a secondary victim.287
283. See CivA 754/05 Levy v. Shaare Zedek Med. Ctr., 218(2) PD 218, 255 (2007)
(Isr.).
284. Id. at 218, 234, 249.
285. Id. at 251, 258. It should be emphasized that this recovery is separate from the
legal recourse available to the gestational parent in relation to the physical experience of her
pregnancy loss. See id. at 246-49 (noting that direct victims who suffer tangible injuries may
recover damages notwithstanding the restrictions Israeli courts apply to indirect victims
seeking reparations for intangible injuries). Under earlier Israeli Supreme Court precedent,
a person who suffers emotional harm as a consequence of severe bodily injury negligently
caused to a close relative can recover only if the emotional harm is severe and provokes
substantial mental consequences. See LCivA 444/87 Alsoucha v. Estate of Dehan, 44(3) PD
397, 433-36 (1990) (Isr.). Specifically, that emotional harm must amount “to a mental
disease (psychosis) or a mental disturbance (neurosis) involving a considerable amount of
disability . . . .” Levi, 218(2) PD at 244. However, that decision left room for flexibility in
applying the criteria. Alsoucha, 44(3) PD at 432. The Court in Levi decided that the
circumstances under consideration justified flexibility and thus ruled that the anticipated
father was entitled to compensation for his emotional harm, notwithstanding the absence of
a serious emotional disability. Levi, 218(2) PD at 252-53, 255.
286. Levi, 218(2) PD at 246, 249, 262, 265. It is worth noting that while the majority
agreed with the trial court’s classification of the anticipated mother as a direct victim, it
remarked that the anticipated mother was not harmed “in the usual sense[,]” as the emotional
distress she suffered resulted from “the death of another—the [fetus] that was in her womb.”
Id. at 246, 249. Indeed, the court opined that the obvious connection between the anticipated
mother and the fetus created a layer of complexity that placed her “on both sides of the
dividing line between a secondary victim and a [direct] victim, with one foot on each side.”
Id. at 249. The court ultimately determined that the anticipated mother could recover
damages regardless of her classification. Id. at 270 (Joubran J., concurring).
287. Id. at 250, 262 (Hayut, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), 266 (Joubran,
J., concurring).
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The majority opinion held that the anticipated father was a
secondary victim, reasoning that the injury he suffered derived
solely from his exposure to the tortious conduct that directly
injured the anticipated mother.288 The majority acknowledged the
emotional involvement of the father in the process of conceiving
the fetus, emphasizing, for example, his “torment involved in the
lengthy and exhausting fertility treatments, the keen anticipation
of the child that was about to be born[,] and the bitter pain . . . .”289
In the majority’s view, however, that involvement did not make
the anticipated father a direct victim, but it nevertheless justified
compensating him for his emotional harm, although he did not
suffer the severe mental consequences required by previous legal
precedents.290
By contrast, the minority opinion of Justice Hayut concluded
that the anticipated father should be regarded as a direct victim,
reasoning that he experienced a direct loss as the anticipated
parent of the eventual child.291 Hayut stressed that the process of
conceiving a child is “the result of a partnership and a joint
physical and emotional effort of the spouses as parents . . . .”292
That substantive involvement, in Hayut’s view, justifies treating
an anticipated father as a primary victim.293 That approach
embraces a both/and view of parenthood, which incorporates both
biological and relational elements, while acknowledging the
central and crucial role of the pregnancy experienced by women

288. Levi, 218(2) PD at 250 (majority opinion), 267 (Joubran J., concurring) (“[T]he
emotional damage that he suffered derived from his identification with the suffering that the
mother experienced and from his being a full partner on an emotional level in the birth
process.”).
289. Id. at 266-67 (Joubran, J., concurring).
290. Id. at 255 (majority opinion), 267 (Joubran J., concurring).
291. Id. at 263 (Hayut, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Admittedly, from
a purely physical viewpoint, the mother naturally has a major role in the process as the person
carrying the [fetus] in her womb and as the person from whose womb the [fetus] emerges
into the world. But this does not, in my opinion, detract from the extent of the father’s
emotional and psychological involvement in the process (except in cases where such
involvement does not exist for one reason or another).”).
292. Id.
293. Levi, 218(2) PD at 263 (Hayut J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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in procreation.294 That understanding is reflected in the outcome,
which awarded higher compensation to the anticipated mother.295
By shifting the gaze from the gestational elements of
becoming a parent toward its relational elements, Hayut’s rhetoric
embraces an inclusive vision of becoming a parent of the kind I
encourage throughout this Article.296 It conveys a clear message
that pregnancy is a joint experience that involves the mutual
responsibility of both (or sometimes multiple) anticipated parents
and values emotional investment by both men and women in
becoming parents.297 Scholars have long discussed how the legal
discourse of parenthood is constructed by such a narrow
definition of masculinity.298 Recently, more feminist scholarship
has emerged that considers how the post-birth, traditional gender
division of labor is shaped by the period before the birth,299
illustrating the potential of valuing the emotional involvement of
both parents already before birth, as represented by Justice
Hayut’s opinion in the Levi decision.300 This is not to say that
judicial rhetoric alone can undo traditional norms or reshape
family arrangements.301 Nevertheless, incremental changes
consistent with that rhetoric would be important steps toward a
legal framework that acknowledges and supports the full range of
experiences involved in the journey toward parenthood.

294. Id.
295. Justice Hayut awarded NIS 500,000 to the anticipated mother and NIS 350,000 to
the anticipated father. That difference is grounded on the presumption that the emotional
harm of the anticipated mother is shaped also by the physical elements of carrying the fetus.
Id. at 264.
296. See supra Section III.B.
297. See Levi, 218(2) PD at 262-63 (Hayut J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
298. See, e.g., Nancy E. Dowd, Fatherhood and Equality: Reconfiguring
Masculinities, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1047, 1048-50 (2012); Dara E. Purvis, The Sexual
Orientation of Fatherhood, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 983, 984-85 (2013). Karin Carmit Yefet,
Feminism and Hyper-Masculinity in Israel: A Case Study in Deconstructing Legal
Fatherhood, 27 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 47, 49-50 (2015).
299. See, e.g., Fontana & Schoenbaum, supra note 219, at 311-13, 315.
300. Levi, 218(2) PD at 263 (Hayut J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
301. See also Daphna Hacker, Single and Married Women in the Law of Israel—A
Feminist Perspective, 9 FEMINIST LEGAL STUDS. 29, 52 (2001).
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CONCLUSION
The time has come to think more seriously about the
becoming of legal parental status. The concept of temporal
discrepancy reveals how traditional understandings of becoming
a parent, embedded in different bodies of the law, marginalizes
certain modalities of life and renders them vulnerable.302 This
concept clears space for considering an alternative framework for
breaking with this understanding and mitigating its crippling
outcomes.
I offer to implement this framework both at the time of the
child’s birth by conferring the parental status as close as possible
to the birth,303 and in the period preceding the child’s birth by
proposing a legal understanding that syncs with the experience of
becoming a parent.304 This understanding acknowledges the
relational elements of becoming a parent, such as the social
burdens involved in the process, emotional involvement, and
other precious human investments that often remain invisible.305
This understanding could be implemented by providing legal
protections to the anticipated parents ex-ante, when they are
anticipating parenthood—as exemplified in the discussion of
work-family conflicts306 —and/or ex-post, when the process of
becoming parents is disrupted by a tortious act—as in conflicts
arising from instances of reproductive malpractice.307
My hope is that this analysis can be used as a starting point
for further scholarly and legislative conversations about how the
law could embrace the process of becoming a parent. Instead of
asking only when does a parent become a parent, we should also
ask: how does a parent become a parent? Framing the question
broadly to incorporate the process illuminates the need to
consider its richness and to examine more seriously its
implications.

302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.

See supra Section II.B.
See supra Part II.
See supra Part III.
See supra Section III.B.
See supra Section III.B.1
See supra Section III.B.2
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While articulating a detailed blueprint for this understanding
as it applies in various legal contexts is beyond the scope of this
Article, my analysis offers several considerations for future
conversations. These include: who falls within the class of
anticipated parents? What timeframe applies to the process of
becoming? Which moments in time are most relevant in each
legal context? This conversation should be framed through the
lens of a gender-neutral understanding of parenthood that resists
a reductionist, biology- and gestation-centric view of procreation,
while remaining attentive to the bodily autonomy of gestational
parents.308
Finally, though the Article’s focus is parental identification,
queer theories of time could fuel us to consider other internal
processes that may be marginalized or simply slip under the radar
of institutional rhythms.309 We should take these theories one
step further and ask whether the law can—or should—embrace
these becomings? Thinking about these questions uncovers a
space in which queer and legal studies have yet to intersect but
should.310

308. I acknowledge that a framework recognizing the richness of becoming a parent
has the potential to interfere with a gestational parent’s self-determination or to minimize the
role of pregnancy. Indeed, this is a concern that policymakers must consider seriously. And,
certainly, it is vital to approach this task with caution, as feminists have been long warning
us about the undesired outcomes for mothers of de-gendering family laws. MARTHA
ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER
TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 70-100 (1995). But as the suggestions I offer herein
reflect, such concerns need not stand in the way of a more inclusive approach to legal
parenthood.
309. Consider the experience of the transgender person whose assigned sex is
incompatible with his or her subjective experience of gender. That incompatibility produces
a similar separation and contradiction between the internal/self and the external/societal
spheres. That separation may commence at birth, when there is discrepancy between the
assigned sex on the legal documents, e.g., the birth certificate, and the expressed or felt
gender of the individual, and continue until the formalization process required to bridge that
gap is completed. The moment of temporal harmony will occur only after the transgender
individual complies with the requirements needed to execute the formalization process. Cf.
Ido Katri, Scamming Reforms- Sex Reclassification from the Body to the Self, in OXFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LGBT POLITICS AND POLICY (Don Merkel ed., 2019).
310. Scholars have urged us to extend the scope of queer legal theory to objects of
research beyond sex into other areas such as theories of time. See, e.g., Brenda Cossman,
Queering Queer Legal Studies: An Unreconstructed Ode to Eve Sedgwick (and Others), 6
CRITICAL ANALYSIS L. 23, 37-38 (2019). Informed by their call to action, I hope this Article
could lay the foundation for this much-needed intersection in the context of parenthood.

